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This study explore. t he co nc ep t of "consen t" i n th e eidetic f r llJlleWork
of Paul Ricoeur ' . philosophy of t he wi ll. Consent , the tbird ' lDO_ nt' in
the ae t of rilling, metges a. the ep i t ome of the r ecipr ocit y of the
volUDta~ and the i nvo l W'lta ry in iu p. tlent a cceptance of the triple
invol un tary : t ha rac t er, t be uncon s c i ous and bi o lo gi ca l lif e . We . hal l
eee eeeer ee e on consen t to char 'eret".
Chapte r I e:uainea R.1eoeur's pbenom.enolog~tal . e t hod , accen t i ng the
notion of int entiona lity an d t he doubl e bracketing i mpos ed by the
~.erli.n method of pur e description. Phenomeno logical b r a cket i ng
el1a1natea the "na t ural standpoint" which tend ' to r eduee the pbencaen. t o
tbeir cau••l f actors while e i de t i c bracketing remove. the exis t en t i a l
' a ec l denU' of t be Fau l t aDd Transc endence, petlll itting secess t o the
fundalllenul atruc:tures of th e ac t of willing .
Chapter I I ah0v8 h(l'll 'cons ent' di ffe rs f ra. the theor etical s t ance
of 'assent' in that it is an ac tive adopt ion of t he i neluctabl e ' s i t ua tion'
c onf ronting us in deeiding and acting. This adoption ee e..s i t a t es a
r e t urn t o tbe s ubj e c t experie1ld ng necessity . Jll t bougb it doe s not prohibit
the use of objective iIldlees pro vided by science sinc e t hes e s erve
diJlgnostlcally in t he understan ding of t he 'corps propr e ' . In Chap t e r I II ,
" c a r ac d r e" is des cribed as t he f inite~ of freedc.. , the perspe ctive
frOla whi ch values .lir e viewed . Consent to one ' s l iaited perspective enables
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chartere r to be u • .-ed 'a one's own. Yet, eeeeee t 11 a l vay. on tbe verg_
of collapse. The ayn t beab of fr eed e. and. na t ure lIeelllll to elude
pbenOllenOlogleal srup and, in Chapter IV , v a ,hOOf IUcoe ur ' • .ave !rca
pu re del;c:r i p r l on toward, a c t i ve partlclpatiou in exi stence and the
i nvoc ation of • se cond Copernican Revolution, repla cing s ubj e ct i v ity by
Tr an scendence and hope.
Chap t er V atte.aptl t o t ranslate Ricoeur ' . eidetic adumbrat ions into
an embry oni c: hermene utic of th e pe ga gogi csl process .
~
RICOEI,lR ' S PHENOMENOLOGY
Eid etic: Analysis an d t.he Doubl e Ilra c:keu
!be goal of t his . t ud, i . to exp lor e t be conce pt of " CODaeD.t " - aDd .
III(l t e pa r ticul arl y. con sent t o " cha r act e r " - II it 1. eJ..abora ted in Paul
Ricoeur '. Philosophy of th e 11/111 , • ar ill-:tncc.ple te , t hree-vol ..... ente rp r ise.
the fiu t volUllle. Le Volont.ire I t L' !nvolontdre . pub lished in 1950 -
which viII . erve . s the lU l u f ocu s of our 0VIl aDalyae s -- pr oc eed s vit bin
what 11 ca Ued an "eidetic" framework , whe r ein the HU8se'r11a.n me thod of
pure de sc ription requires tha t one abstract f rOlll the fac tual i n o r de r to
reach the f lJl1<181l1en t al " sidoa" or meaning . Thus, to ar t i culate the fund a-
lIleDtal s t ru c tur es of villiJl.g , ODe t ake s t he pr ac tical life of co nKlou.aness
" a a it is given" (HI . 216) by l oing . in t he Hu... rlian t r ad i t i on , "ru den
sac:beta N l ba t" - " t o the thina. tbemsdvu" - beyond. an y presuppoll1t1OIU1
or ph llollOpblc:al theo ries.
By abstrac ting frca whatever is _pirie&! - a s s tudied in aD
eclpirical paychology , f or in ataoce - and f re. t he s )'lllbo l i c .- al atudied
by "ay~ of myths - Ri coeur hop e s to unc over the most basic, t he "eide tic" ,
dimens ion of man 's act of willing . What is ab str acted, precis ely, i l the
ethical reality implied in man ' . servitude {wha t Ric oeu r ca lls "la f au te" ,
t he existen tial r ift or cr ack in _n , l analagous to a ge ological f au l t 2) and
the .. e taphya1cal r ea lit y 1aplled in llI8D'a v i sion of deliverance h e. this
se I'Vi tude (.m.t 1l.1eoeur calla "Tn.D.scendence"). Such a double abstraction
iI, as far a' 1l.1coeur 1a eeaeeeeea , "ind1lpenaab le" (FIl , 3) , f or ,
The \Ilet hod of ab'tract io n, i n spi te of t he dan ger of prema ture
conclulion , 11 t he s ol a lIlesn s of pos ing th e problem co r r ec t ly
and of showin g that servrcce e and de liveranc e are thing s that
happen t o heede. . (PH, 33)
rhus , Ili coeur ' s philosophy of the will begins rith a "b r aeke t iDa" of
both of t he se d 1aen siou of everyday vill ina, by se tting the two-fold
acc ident a side fo r th e _ent, by pa re nthelizing t he two a s pect s of the
co nc re t e volitive l if. which lIIay be regarded a s the t win r oot of human
lIIollt'alit y : aan's awarenesa of ain and guilt, on t he on . han d . and , on th e
ot her , th e tendency towards 1nDoc:ftlce ~reaaed in an se t of hope. The
hr aclte tillg , the us e of the Russ arl1an "epcebe'", is t hu s ico:pos ed OIl. "the
fa ul t which pro foundly altera " D'S int elligi b ili t y and • • • 'rr aeee eeee ece
which hides wi th in i t t he ul t:lmau origin of subj ectiv i ty. " (FN, 3)
I t is, perhaps , unf ortuna t e , tha t tlicoau r does not elI!UIl1ne the na t ure
of t he fa ult llIO r e thoroughly than he doe a in hill first vo l ume. Whil . it is
true that t he f aul t 1& one of t ho se foras of consci ou sn e s s whic h 11 to be
1 ef. Karl J a spers , Reason and EJc:istenz , t ransls t ed by Wil111111 Ear le,
Noonday, 1966 , p . 91, wherei n J a spera ap eaks of "the crack in Be i ng" .
2 er, Charles Kelbley , ''T r an slator's Introd uction" , PM, x11i , and
t ranslator' , no te, PM, 215; Cf . a lao John David Stewart , " Paul ticoeur 'a
PhenaaeDOlogy of Evil", in International Phi losophical Quar t er ly , 9 (1969),
p . 572 , and Her be r t Spieg e1be ra , The Ph_ ological Movement, N1jhoff ,
The Hague , 1960, vo l . II , p . 569.
bra cker ed , it 11 sOllf!Wbat dis con certing t o find continua l intnaions of
t hi s pheno_non whi ch , at least in Le Volon tai re et L'Invo lontaire. i . t aken
f or gra nt ed . It must be e spec i a lly ftus t r ating f or philos oph ers of An
analytic persuaaion , like Mary Warnock , who are ave rs e to "uneltSllli ned
aaa Ulllpt iou (a) " an d COllplain that it is " tires ome to COIle acr oa s pe rpetual
references t o this Ul:lexpla i ned phenomenon, which , in t he en d , one sUllpecta
..s y be a kind of t heologi ca l aSSUlllpt i on , an exp lanatory devi ce , rather like
th e Fal1.,,3
That th is last auspi c i on 11 l ess th an j us tified may be seen f rom an
euainat i on of Finitude et Cul pabilit '; . However , it does nothing t o brid ge
whatever gap . there ar e betveen the phenc.enologi ca l and ana l y t i c acho ols
t o plunge into an alr eady sus pect meth odology without atte1llpt ing t o specif y
t he precbe na t ur e of one 's astumpt i ons . In any eve nt , th e double bracketing
i n Ricoeur ' . first vo lume i s , pr ecise l y, "for t.he _ nt". It wi ll pet'ldt
t he pure phencaenol ogical de acription o f these key functi ons ( t.he e ssential
"no tes") o f the will (decision and proj ect , sction and prspa. consent and
sit uation) , t he f0 I1ll81 s t r uc tu res of which sre not dir ec tly depend en t ,
Acco rd i ng to Ri coeur, on either t he fa ul t or t he r e lation to Trans c end ence .
Ind eed , i n t he second vol ume, wherein t.he br s cke t . placed ar otmd t he fault
are l if t ed , a trans iti on is effec ted f r Oll an " ei de tics " of the wi l l t o what
ar eeecr calla an " e1Ilpiri cs " , a t t udy o f wi lling "a posteriori". The fi rs t
pArt of th i s t r i pa r ti te vol ume, L'Homme Fa i lli ble , is con cerned with
3:Mary Warnock, Review of " Fr e edOll and Natu r e" . in PIl.ll oao phieal
~,17{l967) ,p.219.
fallibility , t he conditions of pos sibility (in a tant ian sense) of t he
fa ult, r a th er thaD with th e fa ul t directly ; however, i n t he second part ,
La S)'fIbo!i([Ue du Kal , l.icoeur accOliplishes the IIlOVl!IIent fr.- fallibilit y
to fsul t hy means of a her1leUeutica of vs rious s)'llools and -rths, priaarily
t hos e of the Jud s eo -Chr istiso t r ad i tion. whe re i n IIIsn make a sn "avowal"
(FK, niU) of his empirical , f a llen (one would r ather NY . f aulted )
cond i tion . The t hi r d part , not yet published. proposes an ePpirical nudy
of hcean willing. t he (.reet1on of a genuine philoso phi cal an th ropology :
whic h will , olle gather. _r.hall t he resources of t he 1u.aaan sciences ---
psychoanalysi., political ec tecce , ed uc a tional psycho logy, etc. - ill the
creation of a " philolKlphy of 1Illn". The anthropology with which Ricoeur is
co ncerned is, it mus t be no t ed , a study of 1IlS1\ .!l!!!. man , ' IILSU' in the widest
sense , and i . not t o b. c onf used wi th e.pirica l - 'cultural' and 'physical '
- anthropology . as we noraslly IlIlderstand it , al t hough findings f r ca t bese
sc i ences will, as we have intimat ed, be of se rvice in t he elahorsUon of t he
IDOre t ot al anthropology. Herbert Spiegelber@ su gge s ts t hat Ricoeur 's work
is 'Pe r ha ps tb e gr ea test pr .-b e for (the) f ulfilJ..ent" of auch an anthropol-
ogy . 5 Ricoeur propose . to .tar t hie ant hr opol ogy fro- the evoc:ative power
4 cf. PA, which is dev oted to "the proble-. of philosophical anthro-
pology" . KaDY e:z:1sten t 1a.lUts nse t he te~ in t his way; ef , Hartin
Rei de gger ,~, R 11 tBeing and Time. translated by John
Kacquarrie and Edward Robinson , London , SCMPre .. , 1962, p , 3Y.
5 A1exsnder Pf inder , Phenomenology of Willi ng sn d Motivstion,
t r an slat ed by Herb ert Spi egelbe r g , LFNan ston . ll11noi!./. Nor tbwestero
Uni versit y Pr es s . 1967, p , 35 . -
of th e sYlibol , epi t Olll.1zed111 t he ce l eb ra t ed apho riSll, "te syabnle donne a
pen s et' '' . ( SE , 325) ~
In the final vo lUllle of hia trilogy , Rico eul: 1I1tend.s t o engage in a
"po etics" of th e wil l , t'evolving at' ound. the notion of poet t'y as "the ar t of
conjut'i.ng up t he world as c reated" . (FN, 30) . nee e , it aay be assu-ecl. , the
lifting of the eecond " apoc he", t hat sus pe nding Tr ansc end ence, will permit
a new dimenaion of t he Cogito to emerge and will, as Van s 1na puts it ,
"eeree c th e v1l1 t cwa:rcl.a a creto tive S&1va tiOl1".1 Ri Coet1l: speaks of "the
aSs ul:ance o f a unique Cr ea tion be yond th e r en t o f fr eedOll. aDd nature" whi ch
ac companiea, as hope, our se arch fOI: " a conciliation between t he voluntary
and. t he i nvolunta ry . " ( f!f, 34).
B. Eidetic Desc ription
Throughout this e ssay , we v1ll be coneerued with th e "e i de t i cs" of
t he will , a con sicl.eration of t he IIlOst fundalllental structure s of th e act of
willing ,
t he s t ru c t ur es whi ch a re th e f und_enta l possibilities offered
equally t o inno cence aOO to the f ault a s a CoaD01l ke yboa r d of
human nature on which lIlythical i nn oe ence and empirical gui l t
play in diff ere nt ways . (FN, 26).
6 While IIlOst cceee areeore se eJll to assUllle that t his r hr a se 11 origi-
native with Ricoe,ur , th e au tho r himself r efer s to i t, on a t least one
eece etce , as a Kant is:n "beau _ t " -- ef , "Le Conf lit des Her-eneutique a :
Epi.te.ologie d•• In terpr e ta tinns", in Cabi era I n t ernat ionaux de Sftboli_,
1 (196 3), p- 163. I hav e no t been abl e to l oea te t he lantian sou rce to
t his da te .
1 Dirk F. Vans ina , " Eaquisse , Orientation et Significat i on de
l ' entrepr i s e phU oso pbique de Paul Ri coeur" , in Revue de Hetaphysl9Ue et
~, 69 (1964), p . 18I.
The ...in purpose of I.e Volontaire et L'Involontaire i a to eng age in a pure
descript ion of t he volun t at'}' and involunta ry a spec:t s of human e:dltence and
to~ t he se two ell!llllnn. The volun t ary s . pec t r e f er a to IUn' a own
total ac tivity of willing inasmuc h a s he i s t he age nt of t he wi l l ing process
and incl udes deciding , acting volunt ar ily and con s enting . The invol untary
aspect haa reference to th e na ture which willing con fron ts , especially
lIlU1'a OWD nature, his .,tiv•• , hi. ha bi t s , hil character , hi. uncoulCiova
and hil biological exilte!lCe 1D apace and ti...
Il.1coeu.r' a guiding .etbodologica1 principle fo r hiB analy. e . is t hat
t h e tv\) e l e-euu can be uoderatood only as r ec i pr oc:al. . We are inCliDM , h e
su"e . t . , aDd. t he vet'}' fo~lation of our last paragraph contini it , to
thi nk of fr lledOlll and natur e ae tWl) by r e ason of t he "d oub l e lDOVeaoent " by
whi ch th ou ght , on th e one hand , t end s t o r elegate t he life of the bod ily
and t he ent i re i nvo l untary t o t he r ea lm of t hings while , on the other hand,
"recoiling f rOlll its objecta , (thought) t end s t o i dentif y i tl own life •••
with se lf-con ac i ousn ese. " (WI, 94) . To understand t he vol un t ary and t he
involuntary as r eciprocal iI to ba t t l e againat this pos t ure of dual!8ll
vh:k.h con sciousness , e spec ially post-cart e sian consci ou sn e ss , teod. a t o
asSUDlll. "The 1DvoIUDtat'}' is~ t he will and t he will is by r eason of the
involuntary . " (FJI , 86) . Tha t i s to say t ha t ul t iJaat el y one can be unde r -
s tood on ly by \Ileans of the ot her .
R.icoeur is at sOllIe pa ins to ins i st on th a impo r tance of deacri ption ,
a s opposed to explanation, t he l atter understood i n a naturali s tic , r edc c-
t ionilti c s en s e . Description he de f ines 8S "und er s t anding i n terlll . of ( t he )
relation" of the vo hrntary s nd t he involuntary . (fN, 5) . To und eretllDd
("co-prendre" ) 11 t o t alr.e bo ld of • phenomenon i n i ts toUlity, .s i t
affects t he experi encing Cogi to , while t o explain i s t o reduce t he pheno-
ae l'lOll t o t he ca us al f . c to rs which , 1.0 SODe unner, det enUle i t . "!xpl iquer " ,
f or Ricoeur , is to ex plain away, to s i lllpl ify and reduce th e. complex , r a t he r
t han t o tmde rstand i t in all i ts cc.plexi ty. Thil 11 t he . pproach of
empirical p.ychology whi ch "led t o building up lIUIn like a hccee , first
laying down • found. tion of a psychology of the · l.ovoluntary. th en t oppl.o g
t hes e i nitial f unctional l ev eb with a supplement.ry level called 'will' "
(FN, 4) . It is this 'D.lIt ural . tandpol.o t ' which mus t be bracke ted by the
pbenolMnological ' e poc he ' , t hat s t.ndpoint wh1c:h . ee s the world a. a ....
of things the behaviour of whi ch can be. reduced t o the t ot ality of cau se s
infl uencing t he be ha vi our in a given situation . (cf . n, 222 ff .). What
survi ves the bracketing (Le. the phetlOlllenologic.l , a. dif f eren t from th e
e id et ic , brackating) is the axperiencing Cogi to in t he first pe rson , con -
fronting r ad icslly and :lJDediatel y t he pa r ticular experi en ce .... i t is
given ". Thus , t he Cogito s eelta t o gra.p th e ex perien ced ("vEcu" ) r eal i t y
i n t ha cODtn t of the s tructure of _ing which . llows the experien c ing
cceecaeuen eee to "under .tand" it . (FN. 296 ff .).
An l.ostructive.~le of t be eeeer ••t between desc:riptiDil and
expl an a t ion i . gi ven by Kobak , th e translator of Ri coeur ' s f i r.t vo luae , i n
a eee ee e . r tic l e , wherel.o be citu t be l.ostance of the Bi blical story of
Ezekiel and hi s v1eioc of a whe el within a wheel.8 There. hav e be en many
8 EraziD. V. Kobak, "Existence and t he PbenOUtenolog ical Epclkbe" in
Journ.l of Exi8tentialiSID., 8 (1967) , 26- 7 .
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atteaapts t o a plain t his v1a ion - as an earl y UFO, aa a met eorologi cal
phetlOlDeIlon, or a s a psychologi csl proj ec tion. But al l suc b atte.pts go
ou t aide th e phenomenon i t self and faH to understand E%ekie l's experience,
t o grssp t he lIleaning of t he expe rience as it actua lly occ urred to E%ekiel
himself or t o hia listeners in hearing it related t o tbem. Kobak r eaaind s
us tbat br ac keting tbe explan a t io ns does IlOt pr s clude t beir significanc e
but they a re irrelevant insofar as t he experienc e in t he f i r. t penon i s
co nc erned.
Th1l exa:ap le be.lp s t o clar ify t he directiou of R.1coeur ' s en te rp riae .
\lhat he i . abou t, in sbort , i. a de scription of ..n 's f r e edoa. as i t 11
experienced by _n in hi s exbte ntial cont ex t , even t hough t.his contex t i s
not cO:lllplet e , - t he ethical and met aphysical implications hav e be en
suspended . Now, man will s (be exere f eee hi s "fre edOlll") i n an d t hrough his
body (his " na t ur e " ) . Thus , while tbe f ault may be bracketed t o th e advan-
tage of s fund amental ontology , t he f a ct of man'. i ncarnat i on cannot be.
R.1coeur sees t he f act of inCUl l.. t e ex istence aa present1ng a "paradox" and
a "'yste ry" which is undentSDtiahle , if at aU, on l y in an d th r ough a
de scripti on of the neu t ral aphe re of t he _ s t f undalleota l possi bilitiss of
man, prior t o any consideration of what be r egards a. the exis t entia l
ac c identa of t hat incarn a te exi-rence, n.amely , lio aod guil t , on t he ooe
hand , aod th s bope of t rans ce nd ing one ' s lim i t at ion . , 00 t he other. Her e,
Ricoeur is in the t radition of Gabr i e l Marc el; in deed, "meditation on
Gabriel Marc el ' s work lies s t th e ba sls of th e s na lyses" in Le Volont ai re
et L'!nvolont a ire . (FN, 15) .
\
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I t is obvious t ha t Ucoeu r does not wi sh t o br acket ' en a tenee' i n
the se nse t hat Huss er l propose d i n his trans cend ent al red uc t ion i n hiB
Hedita tioos , 9 any _ r e t han Heidega er doe a , f or vbom pbeno.euology iB
cou.ceived as "an analytic of erlneuce" ~O In f act . fo r l i coeu r , every
co ns i de rat ion dr iv e. him f ur t her away f r Olll " th e famou s and ob s cu r e tran s-
ce nde nt.l r ed uc tion whi ch , we beli ev e, is an oh s t . cle to genu ine und er-
at and ing of penonal body ." (FN, 4) .
C. I ntentionali t y
The _ tbod of . t u ck i s pblClla.enoloaical SDd th u a , by ita very l:1a tu re,
is 1DtentiOllal , 80 that one r e f l ec t s no t 80 much on t he ac t i t s el f .s on
i ts co rrelate -- i n our particul .r ca s e, on " t he willed" - wi th th e
accent on the "00-." ( t he object-pole) r athe r t han on t he "no eais" ( t he
su bjec t -pole) of the intent ional ac t of ¥til ing. It b " t he cel:1t rifugal
movement of t hought tu rn ed t oward the object " (FN, 42- 3) t ha t we ar e
a ttempting t o des cr i be . I t i s t he " vi u e" , th e aim ed -at. This "noemat i c
r eflec t i oo " is a r eflection aD the~ of th e . ev er al intentional
pr Dce • • ea of prac t ical con sc iousness , for ev ery ac t of ccmse i ousne lils
con s ti t ut ea itse lf by t he t yp e of~ to whi cb i t pr ojectlil itself . What
i.1coeur calls "rbe golden rule of Husserlian phenocenology" (FN, 6) is t he
9 Edmund Hus s er l , Ca rtesian Meditations, transla t ed by Dor ion Ca i rn s ,
Ni j boff , The Hague , 1960 .
10 Hartin Held egger , Jl.eil:1g and YUle , cp , Cit., p. 62 .
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di ctum t ha t "a l l cona ciousn e s s is a ee eeeaoue neee of •• . ", What directs
t he purl! description of th e vo l1 tive life., th en , i s the s ea r ch f or "the
willed" , the correla t e of will ing .
The pr a cti ce of the "n oemat i c reflectioD", i n t he -.anne r of BusHrl ,
r eveals t hr ee I t ages in the total ac t of willmg - - deciding a projec t ,
pe rforwins a pragma and cotl aen ting t o a s i tuation . Ricoeur work s out these
three Itage s or I l1lOW!nts" i n t he on e t ot al act of t he wil l by _ ani of •
phenomenological description. However , it se ems th at he 11 indebted t o
Delcar tes f or t he no tion of the t hree "_ en t s " . as oppo sed t o the trad i -
tional t wo. thos e of dec ision and ac tion . Toward the end of th e first
volume, llicoeur cites the Letter t o Pr i ncess Elizsbeth of Augus t 4 , 1645 ,
in which Desc a r tes transpos e s his thre e pr ec ep t s 1.n Di sc our se. on Ket hod 1.nto
th r ee l118:Eias: dec i di ng what t o do and what no t t o do, e:zecut l.Dg on e ' s
dec isions, without being waylaid by pa ssion , and ac custOllling ones elf~
~ wi th what OIle baa . There is . of eeeree , s ds nger in seeing the
t hree .ragea of willing in t his abst ract way . The will is no t a se ries of
acts. "In reality ea ch moment of f reedom • •• unite a act i on and passion,
in it1ative a lld r ec ept iv ity . accor ding t o a diffe rent inrenr ion a l lllOde ."
(FN, 483; empha s is mine ) .
D. The Three 'Moments ' of Willing
Noeaatic re flection r ev ea l a . in t he fir a t pl ace. th e fac t t ha t 1
~. Whenever I wi l l somet hing , I fo t1ll a pro1ect , an "empt y" pr ojec t ,
it is true , but a future projecrion , non e theless , of a certain s t a t e of
I.
I
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affa i rs. I project my.elf t owar ds 8n ac tion which 18 to be ,Jone by me (and
t hu s 8. dec i . t on i a intentionally different trOll a eoaaand) and an ac t ion ,
..reever , which 1& wi thin ay power (and th.... different , in intentionality ,
f roa • siapia wish.) The intentional eOrTelete - the "DoeIaa" - of the
ac t of decision 1& the pr o1ect which I propose . (d . FN, 40 f L). The
project 1s t he " a ction in the ge r undive , the futur e pr agma in whi ch I am
implicated (1n the accusative) .. t he one who wi ll do and who ( in the
nc.inative) is the 00. who can do it ." (Mr . 216) . Thua , the project iapliea
ee e only • reflexivity (J e ~ decide) but alia an intentionality (Je ae
decide.!!! •• • ) .
One of t he few l ucid de finitions of pr o1ect whi ch t hi s wr iter ha s
come upon 1. that given by Alexander l'f ind er . a little-known phenDlllen ologlat.
bu t one whOII. ll1coeur quotes on • number of occasions in Le Volout.ire et
L 'Involontalre and .mo., Spieg elberg sa y8 , be .entiooed frequently a t t he
Secoud Conference for PbenolM!llOlOlY at 1.elr.inaton, Keutudty, in 1964 . 11
pfiDder wr1te s :
I n performing an ac t of will in g t he ego pr oposes t o i tself a
ce r ta1n way of behsv1ng of its own, namely, to do sOllle thini
o r IlOt t o do ~thing . Tbe proposed behav1 0r is to be called
the pr 0 1ec t. Thu s a firs t pa r t of the perfon.anc:e of the ac t
of will is the intent of the vUl (WUlen_inung) or t he
COllsciousness of t he proj ect (Proj ekUbevusstein) "hlch a1Ju
at a ce!.tain future behavior oLone's own ego • •• [ t he decisive
e l _ !I is the chsracteristic practical propos1na . This
proposing i s sue s f rOll t he ego-center, no t as an eeeureece but
11 cf . Herbert Spiege1bers in Alexander Pfander, op. c ic. , p , xv i.
I have, however, found on ly one direct reference to prander in licoeur ' s
pub lished paper frc. thst Conference. er , PWA, p . 20 .
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• • a peculia r doing In whi ch the ego-center, centrifugally ,
from in side itse lf, per f orms a mental s troke . This s troke
d08s mor e than mer ely approve. By it th e tnaanr behy1!lo r of
the self 18 proposed bu t not ye t ac tually executed .
The pr oj ect I s . pretisely , "not ye t ac t ua lly ex ec ut ed" . I t I , " elIIpry". a s
we have ..ld, ina8D.Ich .a it is an unreal thing which ava i ts ita fulf llboellt .
in t he ac tual pr egq , the co rrelate of t he voluntary ac t ion. 13 The pr oj ec t
becOllles the pragma ; the "to be done" becomes th e "b eing done " ; the pro ject
insert s itself into t he \lOt l d throu.gh lIy relatively docile body whi ch
r e sp ond , t o 11.1 " impera tive" .
Now, i t would ae_ that th e se t wo practical ac ta exhaust th e possi -
bUleies of willing . What else tan t here be 111 add i tion t o deciding and
acting! licoe ur point! ou t that t heta I s a certa1n " r e s id uu." f r Oll. the
anal ys e . of deciding and ac t ing. and i t conl18tl of an acquieacellce , withiD
the very deciding and ac t ing iUalf , t o t ha t Dec..lity "which Lt-he Cog iti!
can ne i ther pro pose nor change. " (FN, 7) . It i l Ricoeur 's c laim (snd
her e i n l ies some of the boldne u and novelty of hil a pproach to the wi ll)
t ha t , i ll order to maka a free deciSi on and ex ecute a voluntary ac t i on , there
18 fu r ther required, in every instan ce, a~ to tbe tri ple inevitabili ty
12 Alexander Pfinder. ' "Motive s and Mot ivat i on" cited in pfiDde r. op.
cit. , p , 22 .
13 In t his e llsay we will , liS a matte r of co nvenience, use t he word
' act ' to r e fer both t o the t o t ality of t he willing proce ss and a lso to on e
or other of the t hr ee particul a r ' a omen t s ' we are descr i bing . The term
' ac tion ' will be r e served to designate the se c ond ~nt only - - I.e . the
vo l un tary ..avement which ac cOlIlplis he a the pr as- . B.ieoeur doe a no t aaoke
t his c1. btiDction c learly .
1I_
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pr l!$etlted by ane ' , OWD hUIU.Dity - on e '. "cbara c t i!r e" , HI one ' . unc:on.sc.lou .
aDd an . ' , c:i r c\JiI;8c ribed life. Our conc ern 1. ri t h t he fi r s t of theae
inevit abilities, wi t h ex ploring what it eeece to consent; t o " character" ,
under s tood as an unchangeabl e clat.Ul'll of being mysel f . witbout the fIOt a l
ove r tone, we normally s saod at e ri t h t he word in English,
The " r esid......... which poillts to t he et.ruecure of con sent can be se en
i n t he overf low f ro. Rieoeur '. analyse s of dechiOll and ac tion , part i cula r l y
i n terms of t he i nvolunt a r y dimendons ther eof . The .ethodologic:al option
fo r co nlide r i ng the s t ages of willing 1n the partic:ubr on er i.1coeur ha a
cho se n - dec:isian . action and con.eat - 1., we should point ou t. no
.er e a r b i t rary vh:1JI , f or on e proc eed s thereby b Oll. tha t which ia least
vo l un tary to that which I s t he IaOSt. -- frDIII t he relat i ve t o t he absolute.
The "r a t i onale" f or t his or de r i ng o f topics i s . as Har tllann i n4 ieat e s. "o ne
of 1Der ea8ing s trengt h of t he invollmtary , or. of incr e as ing neaat i v ity
ove r aga ins t t he vill .,"15
Mov. a l thousb decision pa r tskes least of t he. involunt a ry d_nsion ,
that dl.men6 i on (I. e . the na t ur a l e l ement -- t he restric t ion) i . ne ve r f ar
remov ed ; there are no dec i Sions without ~. A pure del!lcription of th e
act of decision r ..,ea.ls t hat i t is no t just a question of dee1d1na .!.2. bu t
also of deciding~ • • • There is an eviden t r ec i pr oc ity be tween the
14 Th1l!l cOlllpl1cated French t erm will be explained in Chapt er Three .
15 lUa ua Rart:llLanD , " Phenoaenology, on to logy and Meu pbyaic. ... 1D
Review of Meta phy sics , 22 (1 968) . p , 91 .
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vo l untary (I fr eely dec ide t o ••• ) and the involuntary (1 decide . however .
by r ea s on s of ce r ta i n~ whi ch incline me to decide this r a t her t han
t ha t ) . Motive. - such 88 need s , pleasure , paiD, the ea.y, the dif fi cu l t
- aake a will actual; t he wi ll aa kes _ Uve. _ 111118ful . This appr oa ch
to tbe und er.tanding of mot ivat i on 18 on e Illpeet of RJ.coeur '. "Coperu!ea n
Revolution" with r e spect t o t rad i t ional psychology . whi ch ,SSUIIeS that
"ne ed, habit . e t c. , have a lIIefoning~ to which t he meaning of the
will CIlD be added i f , t ha t l a , it I s not derived f tOlD. th_" (FN , 4) . For
Rieoeur . eo eav •• "acqu i re a compl e t e s1 gnl fi eanee only i n r ela tion to a
rill whi ch they s oU c i t , dispo l . and gen erally af f ec t , and which i n tu rn
de terainell thei r lignif icanee •• • The involuntary has DOmeaning of lu
OVD." (I'H, 4-5 ) . tieoeur "und ertakes to It.rt out frc. the viII or f re.
rilling to IIaU t he involunta ry uoderstaDdable, instead of fin t de scribing
the f oURS of the involuntary which 1Iould cov er vUI as ve11. ,,16
licoeur ' . monog r ap h on mot ivat ion would lISke an in t e r e s t i ng s t ud y by
i t se l f . I t would , f o r i ustsn ce, be r eve aling to compare it with a sim ilar
en terprise by it. s. Pe ters ,17 pa rticularly d nce bo t.h insist. .0 s t rongl y
ag.in.t. confus ing an t i v es with e....eee , The,. ar e bo t.h iD the t radition of
Pbnder, who insists t.hat "mot.i vea do 1lOt. ca use sn yth1na ; the y.!!!1!l!!.t
sround s . " 18 111&.icnau r ' s t e r1l.S, mot ives " iDcUne wit. hou t coa pelling" . (FR, 71) .
16 L. B. Geige r, "La Philosophe de l a Vol ont e " , in Revue de s Sc ience s
Philosophi gul!s e t Theolod gu8s , 38 (19 510 ) , s- 296.
17 R S Pe t ers , The Conce pt of Motivation , New York. Humani tie s
Press , 1967 .
18 Pf and er , op . cit . , p , 38.
"We c ann o t , 11'1 any ev eut , lIucc wb to th e temp tation to pursue t hi s s t udy
he re. Our mai n inte res t in IIlOtives , a t this poin t , is t o s ee how t hey are
set ov er aga i ns t decision as the i nvo l un t a ry to t he voluntary. as maki ng
decis ions legitimate , and to i ndica t e how an analys is of decision and i tl
IIlO t lves provid.. an intr oducti on to the notion of t hat res iduum we call
"c ons ent " .
Hotivation appear• •• a legit aatization of decision . It I s , at the
._e t~ • • Hldt t.o decision , and this 11'1thre e vay. . Fi r s t ly , _rivea
present II particularity, the particulari ty of perspective , iusofar a s
IIlOtiv_tion is "the ang le frOlll which val ue s Yi ll a ppea r t o a particular
cousc.tousee ee ;" (FN, 342). This perspect i ve , an a lagous to t ha t whi ch is,
perhaps , be t t er known and mora obv ious 11'1 the ca ae of pe rc eption, 1. what
we (a ft er Ricoeur ) a re labelling~. Secondly, motives s uggest a
ce r t ai n incomp let ene s s whi ch , like pa r t i cul arity , is "irremediab l e " . (i bid . ) .
Eve ry decision is a more -or-len arb i t rsry ce ssstion of a chain of unclear
possi ble proj ect.. Thus , it is " neve r laOre than an ialet of cla r i t y in an
obscure -:I ring .ea of unknOVll po t entia l i ties". (ibid.). Tht!y ar e unkDow'll
because tbey ar e unconscious an d hidden. The~ prevents a t otll
IIlO tivation, it " f un c t i ons a s a horizon of an y sy n elll of motivee , " (ibid.).U
Thi rdly, IIlO tivea point to a certain t'ep endt!ncy ri th respect t o b iological
l ife, to s t r uct ur e , growt h an d even de a th , that li f e whi ch i s t he " gi ven I.
19The n udy of t he uocon.ciou. i n Ri coeu r ' . fi r s t vc duee is con side r -
ab l y amplified in one of his la test work s , a s t udy on Fr eud , ct , FR, wherein
he r el a t es psyc hoanalysi s t o his own kind of s ymbol ic he 11lleneutic"-:-
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which makes it possible that there can be values for me" (i bi d . ) in my own
particular place I n history .
Similarly , the second ' moment ' of willing, the action (l'agir), the
voluntary movement which Is exercized in and through the body in order that
the project may be t r an sf ormed frOIlI emptiness into realization , encounters
the involuntary precisely in the body itself, in t he organs of action , which
a re the abilities for performance: preformed skills, emotiona, habita, etc.
And just as motivation is limiting to my decisions , so these abilities,
whi le they provide the will with whatever efficaciousness it has, also are
l imi t i ng t o IllYactions, according to the same t riple pattern: (a) the
incoercible mode of being of my abilities , which is my~; (b) my
~ potentialities which have a certain spontaneity of their own,
a "nature" beyond all con trol of f reedom, i t would seem, and (c) my!!!!:.
itself which is t he source and well-spring of all my powers and all my
effort.
In the case, then, of the inevitabilities we have mentioned , (character ,
t he unconscious and life itself) - - - the "bodily involuntary" - - one is
stuck, as it were , with the peculiarities of one 's condition , one 's
existential "situation" . The question at issue, therefore, is whethe'r
t her e can be any voluntary stance in the face of these invincible "neces-
sities" .
In our second chapter, we shall try to probe more deeply into the
nature of the act of consent , to ask ourselves whether it can legitimately
be called an act of the will and how, if at all, we can be said to exper-
ience necessity in the first person. The question we have ignored in this
17
chapt er - wha t justif ica tion there is for ."UlIing t hat what we have
ca l led " inevit abili t ies" a r e, indeed , b ev it, bI . - - we shall le~e for
our third cha pter , whi r b viII con ce rn i tse lf specifically with t he no t io n
of "character" a s Ricoeur us es and discusses i t . In Chapter Four. we sha l l
examine what phe nomenology 1. able t o provide , and how fa r it c an go i n 8 0
providing , . a an escape fr.. the tl' ad lt1onal duali t y which , . a we have ,.i d
ea r l ier . underst aoding __ t o pr ovoke 1.11 a t r e-pr ing t o C(IIIIe t o t 8",' with
f r eede. , on t he eee band , aDd nature, on the eeeee , We shall see rut any
possible uD.1ty C~ be achieved only by going "'beyond phenomenolosy" into •
Betaphysic. and we sha ll indicat e , briefly , Ricoeur' , p r ep a r a tion tOl: hi.
lI.e tapby alca iD au bse.quen t work • •
We ha d originally i ntend ed t o offe r a fifth chapter whi ch woul d t ry
to preaent s ome augg e s t i ons .a t o how the in s igh t s ga i ned £ 1'0lIl a s t ud y of
consent and of character mig ht be ap plied t o t he ed uc a tiona l pr oce s . . Such
a proj ect tu rn . ou t t o be i nfinit e l y .or e 1IL8ssive than or iginally .ntici -
pa ted . fo r t he question of uni t y which consent ..y be said t o urro r i.
still v ery .uch unsolved at t he end of R.icoeu r ' a first vallDe aDd t o .ttempt
t o build an educati.onaJ. fa bric f ro. inca-plet . cloth is, to say nothing
-ore . pre.....ptuous. Nonetheles s. given t hat any philosophical tbe s is s hould
have its a ppl i cabilit y t o education. it is unf ortunate tha t there ha s not
yet been fo rtbcOD.ing a serioua at tempt t o r e lat a t he phenomenological and
existential eoveeent s t o the ed uca t i ona l pr oc ess . 20
20 This writer ha s eeee upon only one verk i n t his area whi ch Idght
be conaidered somewha t " aerious" : er , Van Cleve Morris. Existentia l1S111 in
~. New York. Ball'er 6 Row. 1966.
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CONSENT AS AN ACT OF mE WIlL
A. Consent and Assent
To say that c ons ent to ne ce s sity is an ac t of t he wil l would seem,
a t f i r s t gl ance , t o be a mi sunderst and i ng of t he t heo ret i ca l a t t i t ude implied
by ' as sent '. Even ' consent' woul d eeee to be II mat te r of i nt ellect ua l accep-
teeee , of saying , "This is bow i t I s . Let it be 80 . " It s eems i t can be
noth1Dg . or e than an a ttitude of cOlI.pelled accept anc e , a ki n to au acceptance
of t ha t irrvinelble trut h which eaerges (r_ . sa 1 , Plato ' , "L ine" , vbe r elll ,
if on e foll~ the Platonic inst ruction, eee be co.es ineluctably aware that
t he t wo mid d l e pa r t s of t he l iDe a r e eq ual , in l eng t h . 2 1 It. c loser ana l y.is,
howev er , r evea l s that the ac t of c on sen t t o th e i nevit ab l e , I n the par t i cu l ar
order , I s mlch mor e t ha n a con sidera t i on of t he f ac t , in _OIPe theor eti cal
vay. When one consents , one is DO l onger a spec t a t o r bemused by one ',
w effieabUity, wt .ore a pa rticipant , dir ectly i nv ol ved , i n an ineffable
va y . in a ll on e 's subjectivity , rith t ha t which he eeeeee a ff ec t in itself .
JUeoeur speau of consent a a a ll. "active ado ption" of, a pa rtieipa tion in ,
nllcesdty. (IN , 344 ) . To co ns en t i s t o .!!!!!1!!. t he " s itua tion", to declare
21 The wr ite r is indehted , fo r this interpr etation of Plato'. ''Li ne ''
(1n t he Republ1c) to Pr of es so r J . G. Dawson of Memorial Dniversl ty of
Newfoun dland.
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i t as one's own. To will the pure fa ct (1.e. what d r udy "h ") - - for
exa.ple . one' s utlctangub!e QY of being oneself - which . a t fu s t s I ght,
appea r s vacuous and _evb,lt :lDane . bee_e. a _t te r of act ually changlq
t he un changeable: not that the fact 1s changed 1D itself bu t I who will it
change i t f or _ yse l f ; I change its ''be i ng- f or1le'' . Implied he re Is t he
ce lebrat ed Sa rtrean distinction between being " en- so!" and being " pou r sol".
To con sent , th er a for e , appea rs DOt 110 lIucb .a an enunci at i on of a
ne ce ssity f rom a theor e tical perspective as a pr act i ca l ad option of the
ne ce ssity , investing it wi th my personal " Fiat " 80 t ha t i t "be ccees" now
" f or-me" . In ch ill wa y, consent I s r es t o r ed t o ita rightful pl a ce among the
pr actical mode s of t he COlico, modes suc h a s vhblng. ccam.anding , de ciding
aod t he l I ke . A• • ea t reaain8 .aa theoret ical mode of t he same Cogl eo , .s
the counterpart t o ' con se nt' .
8 . I nteutionality of Consent
Pure description of the ac.t of consent r equ.i r e . u.. t o discover i ta
intentiOPality. in l in. vith the ev er-present eu .serlillD 1nvcc:atioo., "Al l
consciousness i s a con ac iousness of . . . .. . The co rrelat e of consent wi thin
t he noema -noesis polarity is , howev er , IWch an r e difficul t to locate t han
it s co r respondent i n decieion or i n ac tion. The e es ence of de ciding is t he
prac t ical intent i onality t owar ds a pr01e c t ; the e ssenc e of ac t i on i s the
f ulfillment of the proj ect , through the body , in a ~. What is the
eorre l ate , the nOnla, of th e act of con sen t 1
If we eeepere conaent wi th de ci s i on , a n analogy ca n be f ound in t ha t
bo tb can be e:l<pr l ased . a l ba i t inadequately , a s impe ratives. Decision ca n
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be see n 8' a command whi ch 1 addr ess t o myself ina 9llluch as I can cons ide r
a ,. body as a...ton~s . having ttl 0'I0/D spont8.Delty , all when 1 s pea k of
co ntrolling myself . (d . FN, 47) . Inde ed , medieval philos opher s spoke of
de c i slon as • c:c:aa.nd, an " 1.oIpe r i ..... . Slatlarly . consent can be unde 'ntood
a s t he iIIlperative "Fiat ". as • way of saying "Amen". That 11 ce rtaiDly a
"st r ang e a pe rative" ( FN, 344) fo r it doe s not, 8S the c:omru.nd i n an eff ec:-
t i ve decision , t e rlrlna ce 111• projec t ; it doe . not an ticipat e a change in
t he ord er of t he world . Unl ike a de c i s Io n , c ons ent anticipat es not hi ng ;
i t c:e-and.s iD t he pre sen t aDd what it c:~. 11 already " t hera" . And
what i . a l r eady " t here" i s al so alr ea dy COIIlplete 110 that even in t he midst
of a y decision - t urned towa rd s t he project - I fiDd . y••l f a l r ead y
i nvolved in the " t her e" . i n wha t ha a be en called , aaoua t he exis tent ialists ,
the "situat ion". t he Heide"erian "'Das e in" .
Ul t :lall tel y. t he n , eve n dec ision cannot be r egarded as a c~ud . My
bod y is !I. body ; i t is " Ie co rp s pr opre"; i t i s not ano t he r t hing ami ds t a
clueter of th:Lugs; it is DOt eve n anothe r per~ t o vhc. I could s i ve
dir ec tive s . " I who decide am th e one who wi l l do ." (FN, 48). In like
..nner , there i . no viable dicho t_y , in eee seee , behleeu the 1 who consent
a nd tha t t o which 1 con sen t (the nece s s ity) when that ne~e.s1t,. is the
t r i ad vbich we I:ha.l l call the "bod i ly involuntary " , and abou t which we have
been apeaking , i n general t e r-. s , h i tnerto - cha rac t er, t he unconscious
an d l ife . In other wor ds , to pa r aph r ase Ricoeur , "1 who ccn eent aDI the one
who is consented t o . "
We mus t i nsist t ha t t he~ wi th whi ch we ar e c onc erned in this
enterprise 18 not so .... ch t ha t. of the t o t al world , even lell of the world
I
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ou tside ou rselves , bu t r a t her t ha t of the aU ua tioD pr es en t ed by t he l i=1 ta-
tions of the body itself . The to tal f r amework of the invincible i nvo l un tary
("uatur e" in t oto) certaioly includes the cour se of history as we ll a s o t her
will. in conjunction with o r in opposition t o ou r OWD . but we a re be r e
aba t r act1.llg h: c.. t hi. t ou l context to concern ourselves exclusively with
the "bodily involuntary" a nd , in particular, with one a sp ect of t ha t corpo-
r eality , D8IIIely , character. In any event , there 11 a ca • • to be lIllde f or
U yUl:g that the enti re world. aa t he t.erai nus of OVt consent . i . but a vas t
Ill_tension of t he body , uoderstood lUI the objec t. body or . s pure fact .
Ri elleu r br oache s t his point in sugge s t ing that t he body h t he ~l'lldigm
i ns t ance of ob j ects of con sent. (FR. 343 ) . It is the bodily involuntary
which "lHdu t ea and c~. in some Nm'I e r t o crys tallize a t the frontier of
. ,. f reeda. all the diffu~ involuntary of the worid ." (ovt . 111 ) .
The noema of con sent , t heref or e . is no t the bod y .a an obj ec:t - body,
th e bod y r evealed by t he lOicroacope or t he ererbe ecc pe , I c:anno t r eally
consent t o . y cb¥t.. c t e r- s a pl y .a being " there", s s t hat wbic:h I acknowledge
and, t o _ e:ll:tent, r e s pect and ce re f or , especially when it is in a state
of disrep air. J us t a s I dec:ide by r eas on of motives whi ch are !!!1!! and ar e
not cau s es ex ternal to me, so 1 consen t. t o a neca s sity wbic:h i s & neces sity ,
t o a body which , a l t hou gh sub ject to t he laws of biology and cheaistry , is
nonethel e ss \lniqul ly~.
The sl\IlIe kind of underst anding of my body emerg es if we nov cOlllpare
consent wi th the second 'IIOl:1ent ' o f willing, vo l un tsry lIovemen t (action).
Just aa , through effort , t ha t enipa whic h &el!llUl ever to e scape the "exp la -
nations" of the na t ur alist, I ccevere a r eca l citrant body into an .genc:y
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f or f ulfilling Illy projected decision , so eceeeet, CaD be r~ a•• IdDd of
"powe rless ef f or t . • . which couv er t. Ita poIIede s m e ll int o a new gr andeur . "
(FN, 345) . It is I . 1Il1 8e1£ , who co nver t t he sit ua tion f r olll neutrality into
aine-ne •• , into a a i t ua t i on which I not oaly ac kn owl edge but .1so accept
and incorporate i nto .y way of l l h. in my 0Wl1 service and the se rvice of
e eu ee e • I t Is my body whi ch , in t he fi rat instanc e , allows or pr ev ents
a c t i on . It 18 my body which " pr e sent s l aCWlae fav or able to act i on and
cou f TaDU it wi t h unbr e-.c:hah l e 1illiu . " eFN , 345 ) . No t on ly ac t i on , but
consent, in Ita wa y, i nvo lve. a eeee eceeeea ce rith t he pOlli ble. Action
1_ an ac hlev eaent , t hr oug h ef fo r t , of t be pos sible projected by decision.
Cons en t , on t he o ther hand , 11 a pat i en t ac cep tance of r eality where t he r e
is no o t he r poss i ble i n the r eality itse lf. although .y relationship wi th
the r eali t y con jures up o t he r po ss ibl e a t t i t udes. Tha t il to sa y , I need
not , in f a ct , make t he sit ua t ion my own. I ne ed not consent . There is a t
l e as t t he s l t ernative of refusal. aDd t hus, ev en eenee et i . an . c t of cho ice ,
an act of f reed Oll..
As we pr ocee d in our an alys e s of " separate" ac ts of the will , it 18
nec essa ry t o rem ind ourselvea that any separ a t i on i s an aba t rac t ion.
divo rced £r OIl t he t empor al pr ocess . It i s the s 8Ille will whi ch we are
cons id ering - - indeed t he 6811e ac t of the wi ll - -- from s ev er a l points of
view, in a aethod ic or der : t he wi ll a8 l egitillll t u ed in i t s _ t ivea , the
wi l l a. r end ered ef f i cac i ous in its con f rontation with r elat iv e l y docile
powe r s . and the will a ll patience in the face of t he inevitabl e.
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c. Consent as Patience
When we speak of patience with respect; to the inevitable, when we say
that we make necessity our own, we must be careful to clarify the notion of
"patience" so as not to confuse it with a kind of possession. Possession
invariably implies a certain potential for manipulation - - for t he exer-
cize of power -- and it does not gua rantee permanence . We can be dispos-
seaaed of out possessions . Necessity, on the other hand , I have always
wi th me, as long as I live . Making i t "\Rine" sounds sOIlIehowpeculiar, sfnce
it is mine already . but it Is mine already. and necessarily. only as a kind
of pemanent possession which I cannot rid myself of. To make it t r uly
"mine " involves a ce rtain receptivity, a "powerless effort" to convert a
hostile nature into'!!!y nature, the fr eed om of nat.ure , This, again, is a
vee1"ing away f1"om seeing my hody as an alien "thing" which I own, which I
possess as in the manne1" of some unwan ted, excess baggage. To consent to
the body which is fully~ is to inaugurate "the ultimate reconciliation
of f1"eedolll and aacure" for it is this reconciliation which is 1"eally " a t
stake" in consent. (FN, 346) .
But my "pcserj.esa effort" may not ever be ultimately successful.
Indeed, who can consent in each and every case, fo1" who is not sometimes
ove rcoee with his own limitations, his own suffe1"ing? The unity , of which
consent i s an index, is not likely to be ever reached . Ricoeur imp lies
this notion of unity as unreachable when he presents the movement of freedom
towards necessity as " a sympt ot i c" (FN, 346) and when he etejore.ees the unity
of freedom and nature in teres of its being a Kantian "limit-idea" in his
article , The Unity of the Voluntary and the Involuntary as a Limit-Idea. (WI).
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Again, he su gge sts that "p erhaps the conflict . of the vo l un tary and t he
1mroluntuy • • • can be rec.ooc lled only in hope aDd in ano ther age. " (FIf . 19) .
In any case . t he *C t of c.onsen t is an~ t o extend. t he r ea1a of fTeedoa
int o t hat ilone - t hat 8ituation - vbe r e _ cu re 11() l onger c.onfrOllu our
vill vith ee r e-e e- ae .. <IocU e powers . a s is the e ase w e'l e vo lUDt ary act i on
is e ff ec t ed through t he empl oyment of preformed skill, and habits . Consent .
then , " COJDe S t o t ake t he plaee whi ch t he i nc ompl ete a t t empt baa in tbe
ordez of voluntary IIIOti on" (FN, 347) when t hat mot io n is s t ymi ed .
D. Overcomi ng t he "Nat ur a l Attitude"
Any exten sion of t he r ealm of fr eedOli i nto the zone of na t ure , a
pr opo s of r ec:one lling and un iting the two ar ea s . gi ve. riae t o a c luster
of difficulti es . We are 80 :lDclined . a s we have .....gge . ted ea r lier . 22
under s taud f reeda. and na t ure a. two by se t t1Jl.g up • su bjective-ob j ec tive
dithe rcay be twleen the bod y and t he ego t.hat ve a r e t ea pted to trea t aeeea -
s i t y always " objectively" - [ exist aDd the SU ua tiOll !eXists ; ¥bat ce:-:m
I tanda r d c.an OIle fiDd betveen t he "subject " and t he " obj ec t " U one vis be s
t o ov ercome t his pe rsis tent t ea pt a tiOD? Fnr Ricoeur , a l fo r phencaenol~
gists in gene r al , t he " na t ur a l attitude " whic h sees thB in voluntary (aotive l ,
a bili ties , t ha ra cter , e tc . ) as an obj ective r eali t y lIus t be overcome by
s tr i v i ng t o d i s cov er t he i nvoluntary " a t the ve r y hea rt of t he Cogito ' s
integral ex perience" (FN, 348 ) , so that t he que s t be cometl one of f indin g
"n ecessit y in t he fi r s t person ." (FN. 9).
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te. rta1nly . t he human~. inso far aa i t r e flee u the t otal
inevitabili ty of t he world , would &eelll t o be i nU ni t ely .are knowab le by
_ans of the appropr iat e ae i en t U i c:. t ectmique a . Wa a ra i nclined, indeed .
t o uaaiue nece s sit y £1'_ a d h tance , t o obj ectify .an a. t otally as
po.ai ble , to se e oneself .a but "an encounter lIaODI • c:ondderabl e n.... be r
of pos.i b l e genetic: combinat ions" . tbe produ c t of "blind and ab su r d
cha nc e" . (FR. 34 8) . Thus , t he possibility of consent ing t o necessit y and
the possibility of re c onciliation evaporate and we ar e catapulted into a
total determinism . How 18 it possible to escape this t end ency and I ntr o<luce
a subj ec t con sciousne s s , espec i a l l y when i t 1s 80 pa t ent that , in many
respe c ts, our bodie s are l i ke t ools which Deed t o be ca r ed f or and treated
a. " t hing s " . even I f " t h ings" of some conseque nc e '
Kor e..ve r , t he IDOl'S W'Il ob j ec t i fy Ila n , t he -.oTe _ escape OUTs e l ve s -
an d _ do scaetiae s yea I'l1 t o escape Tespona ibili t y . Vben t he ee eec r o f
being f ree - and of baving t o an 5WeT f OT one 's aeTs, of be i ng "ee s pe e se-
a ble' - bece-es in~PPOTtable . on e can al_,.s Te soTt to t he t eneta of
deteTlliDiSll to pTovide oue vith a l ib i s fOT a c t f.ona; whi ch one sees a s und e-
s irab l e or with pr etex t s f OT inaction when action is t he dea i Tab l e . What
Ri co eu r calls " t he 1p4;11 of ob jec t i vi t y" (FN, 347 ft.) s erves t o sbo l i sh
lIle IIlOr e and mor e in a " dialect i c of alien a tion" , (FN, 349). This clear -cut
payc ho-phys i ca l dua l i Pi tri e s t o Telate inner f r eed Dlll t o OUteT nature 1n
t erns of causality -- the kind of "mental physic a" whi ch aees motives aa
causes . Psychology s omet i mes s eeks t o avoid a t ot a l de tel'lllini sm by t rying
t o establish a " link" be t ween the ps ychical an d th e phys i ologica l through
a par t i al caus ality , s ee i ng the sit ua tion 8S a ne gative ki nd of ca usal i ty ,
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a co ndit io s ine Qua non . Such a r ela t i onship , howeve r - a relationship
be t ween obj~tlv. ne celll1c)' ancl w bj eeti ve f reedOli - re:ulna. fo r iicGeur,
stll1 " . dec ep tive and un tenabl e fon of <:8.....11ty applica bl e on ly be twien
object and object . " (PH, 351) . I t doe s not pr ovide .... with th e homogeneit y
of eerea, that pro portion whi ch 1. r equi r ed in or de r that ne c:. ea l1ty be
conver ted into freedOlll.
Ricoeur re.:Lnds ~. on sevnal occasion. t ha t the re can be DO pan W
de t e I1a!nlS111 - it I s a case of a U or Dothing. "e au s e give up any a ttempt
"to l odge fundamental structures of willing • • • in the i nterstice a of deter-
mini_" fo r th e r e s r e no ga ps I n detendnh lll i "itl 8upremacy 11 i n pJ'l nc:.lp l e
coextensive with empirical obj ec t i . l ty . " ( FN, 68). Thus, in coulid erinj;
..r i v ea as t he correlate of decision , lUcoeur 10shu that i t 1. aean:1n&leaa
to a ak whe ther lIIotlva t ion 18 an .,pec t or II U .itation of empirica l ca usality
be cau se s uch a quesr ion au ume s a prior na turalization of the Cogi t o. When-
eve r we con ceive nece.dt y (even nece.sity wi thin motivation) objectively ,
we a r . left with dete:rm.n.i_ and i t i s no longer po llibl e t o reintToduee a
SIlbject con sciousness fo r such cOlJaciousne .. would be nothing bu c an eleaent
or a product of a chara cter type, a product of unc cn ecfcu a fo rce. or an
effec t of the genet ic: stt'\lcture of t he or iainal ee bryo . Once determinism
is tnvok.ed . it perctze. ita " spell" and 11 inesca.pahle.
2 . Necessity i n the Firat Person
Any s ttempt to r econcile the voluntary and t he involuntary r eq uir es,
then•• r e t urn to t he IUbJect - to find ne cessity in the Cagito, congruent
wi t h the mot ives of decidon and the "hi U t i e. thrO\l&h whi ch on e ac t a . Pure
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descripti on of co nsent involves us i n a r t iculating "wha t it mean s gorme,
or fo r t hai! to und ergo , to experience t he i ne oe r c ible . the inevit ab le."
(PH, 351) . The only ~11n which con sent can be se en as lID ac t of f n ed ca.
i . by " l i Dlting .. it vitb neeessity ewrleneed. within ou rselves, no t vith
necessity conce ived, i ll any wise , ob j ec tively.
This r e turn to the 6Ubje e t sugg es ts that we Ill! gh t have t o f or ego the
indispu t able be nefi t s ava ilable frca. scientific research on t he bodily
{!%Voluntary - cha racter ol ogy . Fread1an aoalyda and otber late r fo ras of
on the testt.oDy of ou r own private experience. But sUbjectivity doe. no t
be speak some manner of private . i rn:OIIIIlUnic:abl e i n t J:'ospeetion. It mu.llS, f or
Ricoeur . "the s ubject fun ction of an in tentional eon sc i ou sn e s s suc h that I
understand it as appl yi ng to .e~." (WI . 100 ; elIphas1a . 1ne) .
It perDiu the elaboration of concepts of sub j ectivit y valid for all .en
(c f. n. 11). 110 that the. phe no.enology of the lived bod ,. is "a phen ODetlology
of inters1,lbJect ivit,." (WI , 100) . The subjec t is a lway s ". ys elf .!.!!!! your-
se lf". (FN, 10) .
Diagnostic Use of rapirical Science
The r etutll t o t he su b j ec t - ¥betbet to "_" or t o " t hee" - su gge st s,
i t ...lIit be confessed , a predc.inatlce .)(I(r what ODe fe els ov er what one knows
(and oft en i nc Olllps r sb I,. be tter and mor e surely) f rOlll empi rica l sciences.
However , Ricoeu r is a t pa i n s to in sist t ba t " t he r e i s no i nten t i on of dis-
. islling eIlpirica l knowledge. " (UVl , 100 ) . weeeed , in f ac t , to se t up a
"dialectic be t ween the bod y as a pe r sonal bod y LCorps pr opr!.! and t he obj ect
1
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bod y . " (n. 12) . Info~t1on gluned frOll;bioloSY aDd psychology h often
the W)st. noraal r ou.t e fo r r eaebJ.n&: the su.b1 e e t ive equivalent we are searching
f or . Sc.et.:lmes •• pheno-enologieal con cept Y1l1 be DOthing .,re thaD the
su bjec:tiviza t lon of • concept ..eb be tter 1<nowD in an e.plr iea1 framework .
The relationship between a plr1 eal concepts (refer ring t o t he obj ec t bod y)
and their pheuOIIlenol oglc al counterparts is t e:rmed. by Ri c:oeu r • • diagnostic
r al.tioD. . A diagnostic \,Iae of empirical c oncepts 11 • lU t ee r of describing
the ways in which the CogieD beccaea actual in t he world (its " sympt oms " .
in other words) and then applying this description to the uncover i ng of
the underlying intent ional a t ruct ur e s which ate made tnanifes t t hr ough t he
8)'111ptOllS . "Eac h~nt of t he obj ec t body 18 an ind i cation of t he bod y
belonging t o • subj ect, vhether of its oven.!! affec tivi ty or of SOIII.e
pa rticular f unction . " (IN , 13) .
The terlll "d iagD08t i ca" 18 der i ved frOlll.edical acienc e. The doc tor
us e s S:7lllptOll analysis (SJllptcxutology) in t he service of e.api r1cal know-
l ed ge, the $ympt ca indicating a fun c t ioning (o r , .arB ullU&lly, a IIa lfunc-
t ioning) of t he objec t body. The phe nOllenologlst us es the " f a c t s " ga t he red
by ps ychology , fo r 1Dat anee , aa • spr ingboa rd fo r getting to the :real
meaning to which t be fact a symptcaatically po int . Ricoeur ' a analysia of
"n eed ". for eX8ll;ple. augges ta that ps ycho-pb y.iological accoun t s of need
are incomplete , even .. i ll.ad in g . " I do not know need frOlll the ou ta1c:le , a s
a na tural eve n t , bu t f r om within, as a lived need and , when needed , t hrough
empathy , as you r s . " (FN, 87). The object iv e de s cript i ona made available
t o us by pbysiology - - deterioration of t i a sue a , glandular r es c t i ons , e tc .
- a r e us ef ul only in. of ar a$ they serve a s positive i ndicators of the
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prescenc.e of a lack and to help us understand what I experience when I am
i n need. This approach to the bodily phenomena is still another aspect of
the Copernican Rev olu tion "whi ch restores to sub jectivity its due" (FN, 31 ) .
No l onger , t hen , do we t alk of consciousness as a symptom of the object
body; r athe r we will speak of the object body as a symptom of t he " cor ps
propre" i n which t he Cagito sh ares and t hr ou gh which i t exercizes i t s elf .
The diagnostic, then, is a procedure in the realm of discourse - -- i t doe s
no t seek to describe the union of sou l and body. t he r eby r esurrec ting a new
kind of dua lism and undoing t he CQpernlcan Revolution, but r a t he r it is a
way of t alki ng about the on e r ea l ity, t he body which is mine , £r Olll two
points of view . As Ricc..eur points Dllt, whatever oppo sition there is between
"subj ect body" and "ob j ec t body" is not the oppositio n of one point of vi ew
towa rd s myself, my own unique body, on the one hand, and another point of
v i ew towards bodies other than mine. Rather i t is an opposition of two
points of view towa rds t he same body , whe t he r mine or yours . (FN, 10) .
"The diagnostic r ela t i on exp resses t hi s encounter of two universes of
discourse." ( FN, 88).
In this r espect , diagnostics is akin to herme neutics, with which
Rdcoe ur i s involved in Symboligue du Mal and in his recent msssive work on
Freud . (FR) . While diagnostics exp resses t he en counter of objective,
empi ricsl description with accounts of underlying intentional structures
or mesning , hermeneutics exp resses the en coun t e r between symbolic and
mystical exp ressions of human experience and the l a t ent underlying meanings
which these form s of exp ression articulate. I n our t r ea t ment of character ,
we sha l l have occasion to make diagnostic use of (we shall, that is, en ga ge
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i n a k i nd of he rmeneu tic . of) t he findings of etholoa;y t o \lUc;.over t he
subjective el ements to which thes e discoverie$ point and of whi ch t bey ar e
tbe indicators. SoIHtiaea , i t 18 difficult (if not u po u ible) t o fiDd an y
INbjective i ndicator.. M Reaga n says , i n I!IUIIIIDarizil1& Ri eoeur , "(w hile)
in gen er al. i t 11 po llible t o discover an empi rical co rrelation between
mentalistic dis courl e an d phy . lc:al dis course . • • t hese t wo l an guage. a r e
no t pa r.lId a iDee t here are aoae thiDga de -.c:rikble in Doe of t~ vh1eh
ha ve no co r r elat e i n th e other .,,23 Pa r ticular ly is t his t ru e in t he are a
of the bodily involuntary. of which tlul pa rticular !.Datanee of birth i l
IDOst t renchant. Physiology can give ua very pr ecise detaUs of a y birth
event but bow do I descr i be 11.1birth subj ec t i ve l y since .y birth 11 a lways
" f or othere" and nev er "for lIIys elf" . (et. fIf. 4]3-43) . S1ailarly and
co nve rsely, llicoeur seel the ex perienc e of effo r t in the overccmi ng of
bodily r u iataue:e II de s.c:r1blble oul y in subjec:tive teratl with no co r relate
on the phyd ological plane. {ef , FN, 308 f t. ) .
We can ... up the :lmplications of t hi l long de tour t hr ough t he r eal..
of di agnol t i cs by sa ying that the r e turn to t he subjec t. t he t ranscendence
of t he obj ec t , does not require us t o ignore the dats of empi rical invest i -
gatiOll . Rather , we retain t hat data , enuntiated in the l angua ge of ca u sa l i ty
s nd , t a t iatic I, as an~ of the subjective r e l at iOll be twee n f r eeda. and
an experienced nece ssity . Thus , we apea k 0::: t he hlaan~, r e f erring
t o that nec e s sity which i s the ver y nec es s i t y of lIy being s t a ll -- .y
23 Char les E. Reaga n, "Rl coeur ' , 'D iagnostic ' Rel ation", in~
Philosophical Quarte rly , 8 (19 68) , p , S89 .
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pa r t icular .ooe of ex istenc e (in tbis place , at thi, t ime, froa thele
f oreb ea r s ) whi cb I diet not choose , is t he neee aaary condi t ion in ord er
that I lIay be nce f o r t h ch oos e . Consequently. condit i o sine qua nOD I, Doe
of the i nd i ces of necessity which diagnostically point to f reedOlll . I t (the
condition a . an i nd ex ) 1mplie . tbe union of inte rnal necessity (which is
partul aud r ec i pr oc a l with freed Olll) and ca usal necessity (which 11 t o t a l
and wi t hout r ec i procity) . Language like tI. l t u&t l on" and "condit ion" I '
useful , therefore . "to indicate and announca a flea t 1llg experieneed nec-
essiey vb.1cb f reed.. in pr inci ple confront ., r e f us e. or adop t .... (n. 352) .
However . the indu of .~ptOlll func tion whic h causali t y presents does
not cover all relations of f reedOll and ne ce s . ity - the r elation of t he
~ of cho i ce , for in l ra nca , t o t he Unite perspective of a)' charac t e r
i s difficult to express a l s r elation of cond i t i on , r..e, by sayi ng t hat
charscter is a condition of choice. Description would require (if we wi sh
to f a ithfully expres s t ha subjectivity of .!Z cha racter ) that it be seen
r a t he r aa aD ac t ua l !!2!!!. of cho ice ; it 11 only in such a fonwlation t hat
a r eciprocity of f reed.. and na t ur e i s saved . 24 Ttws, we need t o go beyond
t he language of causality which serves i u purpon in denoting aD e.pirical
reality whi ch we aay us e in t his d1ag:D.ostic f a ahion , to ge t bac k to
" f initude i n t he fira t pe rson" , t o pa raphraae lic;oeur .
24 The French p'!!ycho l ogist, Burloud , who ha s himself written a trea-
tise on "ebaracrer" LA~ Burloud, Le Carac ti!:r e , Pa r i s , Presses Univer si-
t aire s de Fr ance , 194Y f inda Ricoeur 's ac co un t of cha racter aa a ecde of
freed Olll "rather reckles a"; it " sounds s t range t o a psychologi st ' s es r"; cf ,
A. Burloud, Book Review of I.e. Vo l on t a i re et L' I nvolontaire i n~
Philoaop h1que . 144 (1 954) , p , 284 .
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G. Nec essity as Negation
The fact r emains , none t heles s , t ha t undet-atandfng tends, i nevi tabl y ,
to see character (a s well as the unc.onscious snd life) as a negation , rather
than as a~, of fre edom. The birth of reflec tion is always t he rupt ur e
of an i nitial ha noo ny - -- th e pre- reflexive uni ty -- of consciousness and
t he body . It is, of course, this possibi lity that what eppeera to be a
basic., ontological unity may be resto r ed t ha t gives grounds fo r hope in a
conciliation of the pa rado x of freedom-nature. But , a t the same time , an y
at tempt to est<lblish s uch a r e s t or a t i on is constantly bound down by t he
t endency of unde rs tanding to s ee necessity a lwa ys as a condition, a l i mi t ,
eve n a destruction, as a n eg a t i on of freedom . To the extent that f reedom
and na t ur e are seen t o be incompatible, t h e only possibilities for the will
in the face of nature are defiance or capitulation . Thus, cons en t wi l l
either be i1llpossib1e (f or there would a l ways be a ' no ' and never a ' ye s')
or it wi ll be a s urrender . To cons en t requi res some kind of transcendence
of the initial r efus a l, without which there would be only the fact of the
continulllll of nature . The possibility of refusal opens t he way fo r an
acceptance, a "maki ng my own", fo r "the yes of consent is always won f rom
tb e no". (FN, 354).
This negation of a negation , br i ngi ng us back to what J ean Nabert
calls "affirmation originaire"25 will be discussed in our fourth chapter.
25J ean Nabe rt, El ement s pour une Ethigue, Paris, Aubier. 1943 , passim,
especially Le 2e Livre . Lc f . El ements for an Et hic, tran,!.lated by Wil liam
J . Pe trek , Evanston , Nor thwestern Uni ve rsity Press, 196.2/.
"CHAPTERIII
CHARACTER AS MODE OF FREEDOM
A. The Meaning of "Car ac t <l! r e"
The translation of t he French t e rm "caracte re" as " char ac t er"
presents a number of d iff i culties . I n English, the eere usua lly has a
great many IIlOl'sl overtones. Unlike its derivative word , "characteristic",
which reeatns r elatively ne utra l , the root-form has , as Allport puts it,
"ga t her ed ••• much eth i cal moss. ,,26 One sp eaks of a sp lendid cha racter.
an evil character or of having no cha racter at a ll; employers look for
character re fe rences r ega r d i ng t he i r pr ospec t i ve employees; educators
sometimee speak of themselves as cbar act.er-eoul.der s , For t hi s r e ason , i t
might be preferable to t ranslate the French term as "temperamen t". an
English term which exp resses somewhat more accura te ly th e sense of
"caracdlre" as th e i nd i v i dua l' s "style of consciousness" , his "pa r t i cul ari t y"
(FN, 341), fo r "caract~re" does no t belong in some hierarchical scale of
values but is rather "the angle from which values wi l l appear to a pa rtic-
ular consciousness". (FN, 342 ). The content of "caract~re 1) is irrelevan t
- - i t does not determine whe ther I shall choose this possibility or that :
it is rather a form which marks t he choice I make with a certain stamp ---
26 Gordon W. Al lport , Personality: A Ps ychological Interp retation,
New York, Holt, 1937, p . 53.
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of nervousness , placidi t y . sangu1n1 ty or othe r " tempe r_ur ". However,
s i nc e the tran s Lat or a of Le Volant.ir e et L'lnvolontalre and L' &.De
~ hav e cho s en t o ...ba1 t t o "the fatal lura of • cognat e " . 27 we
. hall coDt:lDue to s peak of "character" . understood 111 the peculial: nOll-
llIOr a l sense j ust enu nt i ated .
My character, t hen, 1s understood ss . y pe n pettive, my way of being
mYlielf . We se e it aa par t of the abso lu te 1nvol unt ary and we discover i t
as a "re s id uum" of t he a na l ys e s of t he r elative involuntary i n th e a reas
of decision and ac tion. Thus, it s tamis both for t he particul arity of my
motivat io n which " inclines but does not tOlllpel" me in my decision-making
(d. PH. 7l) and f or the Incoercible mode of being of lIy abi llt i es and
e ffor t t hl'ou gh whi ch I IIllve .)' relatively doet18 bocl)' re all.,. voluntary
ac ta . It I s, i n , bor t , t he~ of .,. pr actical be i ng. Ju st , . my
particular pe rapect i ve of tb e obj ec r is tbe f ini te aoc:Ie of l1Iype r ception ,
so IIY chara cter ..y be understood . anaLagoudy, as t be Iffeetive and prac-
tical perspective of .y uht enc e. In L'H~ Paillibl e lticoeu r succintl y
def ines " cha r acter " 's "a t oU l izatiOll of , 11 the a.pec.ta of f ini t ud e" and
trie s to effect ' " pr ac t i ca l lIlI'!diat i Oll" be tveen fini t e charac t er and infinite
ha ppines s . ( d . I'M, 77 ff . ).
B. "Cha r act er " in the First Per son
How do I reach an underllcanding of character all !!. cha racter , as one
of the co rrelates of th e ac t of consent? To d i scover "character in t he
27 FN. ''Tr a ns lat or ' , Introduction" , p. xxxiv .
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f i r s t per s on" an d t he r eby ma i nta i n t he reciprocity of the vo luntary and t he
invol untsJ:y, which is t he guiding thread t hrough all the Ri coelltlian an alyses ,
is a very difficu lt task . One's inner . su bjective ex perience of charac ter
is , unlike the inner exp erience of, sa y , need or desir e. extrem e ly fleeting
and epheme ral . One se nses the iInpossibility of co nceiving of :!!!I. character
akin to the impossibi lity of conceiving of !!!:l.birth , which I s " f or others"
and nev er " f or me" . And ye t it is on ly to the extent that 1 ca n see my
character subjectively --- at the lillltes of t he obj ec t i ve knowledge which
pu rveyors of charact erol..., gy and personality inventories pr e sent t o me - -
that I ca n sp eak of co ns ent t o cha r a c t e r as an ac t of t he will . Only to
t he ex tent t hat 1 can see characte r as " ex perienc ed nec essi ty" wi ll 1 be
ab le t o personally r ecogn ize it as a " gi ven" t ha t is "there" t o be made Illy
own and us ed in my s ervice and that of others.
But t o see cha racter subjec tively i s ra t he r ou t of t he question
without f i rat having r ecour s e t o the findings of empi rical scienc e. To
reach aub j ec t i v i t y in this area we wil l we t o de t our t hr ough t he maze of
ethological da ta . examining these findings and u s i ng t hem in a diagnos tic
manner. to assis t us in r each i ng "exper i en ced necessity". of which the
ethological information is an indicator . t h i s philosophical analysis of
cha racter is e spe c i al l y impe r a tive i n t his age when educators tend to pl ac e
so much r e l i anc e on ap tit ude tests and IQ t e s t s aa "character port raits" in
which stude nts are di ligen t l y categorized in t he fi eld of vocational guidance .
Without suc h a phi l osophica l ana l ys i a , any effort to un ders t and statis-
tical profiles en cou nters the hesitstion of a common-sense app roach to char-
acter which finds itself unable to find a "link" be t ween one 's natural
- t
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eod~t • • 011 the one band . and aan's apparent heeda., on th e o ther .
The non - ( or pr e-) philosop h i ca l att i tude vae illatu wi t hin an e i t he r-or
position . Ei t her man b totally f r ee . un dtll.ted and unconditioned ,
unlimited ; or iliaD is totally unfree, det ermi ned and condi tioned by his
envirol'llllent and his hered ity , so that f r eed om 1• • myt h or a fie tion.
One's an thropological v iew , in t his ccneexe , 1. eit he r t hat of "sn 1OOe-
finitely plastic human natur e ••• i n whi ch even cha ract er would b. chosen
and could b. changed through effort" (fli, 355) or of an inflexible .......1'1
na tu re in vb:1ch ea.eh aan '. lot aDd dearb,. is alru.dy inscribed aDd wherein
aan is redllCed to all object. Sueh an attitude iapU.s t ha t there is no v ay
in vb1e h f reMOII can be seen •• !!1iI.!:!. . nature, 110wa y t o e laborate a eon -
ee ptioD of cha rac t e r which 1. no l onger an objectified " condition" hu t
the individual 's~ of being f ree. Char ac t er , i n thi s l atter sense ,
woul d have a "eeandng " only in t he context of a vo luntar y ac t whe rein --
and only wherein - i t i a ac t ua l h ed . Ve woul d no t t hen see a con fron-
t a t i an between willing (cansent). on t he one hand , and necessity (character) .
on t he other. Rather than a " t ug-o f -wa r " between freedOll. and ...ture . we
Wt)I,Ild Ile. charact e r as an _ipresent aspec t of .y toU1 seU, an invincible
aspect of . y motives which 1 e&1l cOIlt rol fru l y, an lIlcoercible aspect of
ay abilities which 1 call bring und er .y dOllllnation and as a Ilon-tlled
aspect of lily decision and Dy ac t i on. "L i ke . y freedom, it i s .lwsys
pr e sent". (FN, 369) . Character , as Ri co eur quite unequivocally pu t s it ,
is " t h i s individual who I &lII". (FN , 368) .
Now, while an obj ac tive de tour through charactero logy b necessary as
a pr el:lJainary to an unde r a tsading of characur . s ~ (o r .I2!!.!.> character .
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i t 1s, none theless. incapable of leading us dl!'l!ctly to such an understanding .
tic:oeut'S USI! of t be Iciance of chara cter is at rictly "d:Lagnostic" -
ethology serves . a an todn: of t ha t part of natura which 18 expe rien ced in
t he first pe rson a••,. mode of being f ree . tbe su bject ive counterpart of
that "nature" vill , as Ri c:oe ur confesses . be evell more obscure, in the f i nal
analysis ; however . dllcovering i t 1s t he on ly way in which we aa y pave th e
way f o r an y mean i ngful app reciation of t hat ac t of t he wi ll which 1s cons en t .
and 011 the pos s ibilit y of whi ch we are t aking . 8811lb1e . (d . FN, 358).
C. Charac te r Study Capsul e His to r y
The e thological da ta which Ricoeur usn is tha t of t he Dutch school
of Groningue, He,..ana and Vl erSllla . supported by LeSenne ' s Fr ench veT.loo
of t he Dutch class ifications. The re are mmerOU 8 other claaaificatioos
vb.ich one aight adop t . I Pdeed , t he s c i ence of c:ba r ac ter . biO'lll1 by divers
IUaeS. is as old a. Aristotle ' , "character port r ai t " of t he l i beral .all, or
the IIOre elaborate de acription of t he _gnant.ou, _ 0., i n 1Iook. FOI.1r of hi.
Nicholl.ache.an Ethicll.
Aristotle' l pupil ao.d successor, Theo phrastull , i s especially faJlOUs
fo r his t hirty nc~r.cterl" which have tabn t heir plac e in l iterary
classics . The seventeen th-cent ury French wr i t e r , J ean de l a Bruyer e,
produced a numbe r of of t -imitated char ac ter .ketches, whe r e in a c er t a i n
pe culiar life-styl e permeates every activi t y of the i ndivi dual character i zed.
Even IIOr e anCient than cha r ac t e r - wri t i ng and c l oser i n s pi r it to the
modern sc i ence of character is t be doctr i ne of the humour. and their
co rresponding temp eram lnt., based on ElIpedoe l e l ' c o_ ie e l _ n t s of air ,
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earth , fi re and water . While the s pe c i fic "hUlll(lura" advanced by the
ancient s . such a s Hipp oc rates, hav e been aba ndone d, the princ i ple of
paycho- phys i cal corralaUoD r emai n-t ev en todf,y. Witness the impo r tance
given t o ehemical luba r ances 11ke hormones in any consideration o f the
ne rvous .,.srea. Other fOT1ll8 vhich chsl"acterology have t aken include
phya1osOlllY . ph renology and the acre r e cent .:q.ed.-ental e thology, a fa r
c ry from t he ivory- rover ethology of John St .att Hi ll . On_ of t he IIOst
at t rac t i ve of t he s e c lass ifi ca tions is tha t of Adol phe Ferriere , who
descri be s twelv e " t ype s" of pe rs ona l ities : f our pr e-r a tiona l (impulsi ve ,
pr l Il1t1ve . hero i c-b llig i native and conventional-traditional types). f our
r a tiona l (individualistic , logical , sociable and 'uneasy' types) , and four
t r ans-ra tiona l (intuitive , . scetic, aystic and perfected typea).
We are not, however , concerned with an .l.boration of t he s e part i cular
ca tegoriza t ions . What we a re i nteres t ed i n i s t o s hov t hat" by its~,
cha r ac ter o l ogy pretents t he kind of an th r opology whi ch woul d fo r eve r reduce
man to the status of an object a nd which pr even t s us f rom r elating t hb kind
of cha racte r COllst t ..Ct to the f reedOD of the a ub j ec t whose cha ract er it 18 .
D. Cha racteroloSI versus Sub1 ectivity
The method in char ac t e r s c i ence is the a u r ch f or charac te r " por traita"
c01llbilli ng the dia tinctive fe atutes of an individual ins of ar &s these can be
incor po r ated i nto a mi nimUlllnunbe r of ca tegories , Ot " t ype s" . Two distinct
methods are 'empl oyed i n pur su i t of thes e po rtraits - - t he b i ographic lIe t hod
and th e questionnair e IIlet hod. Now, t h i s approach which ab.a a t a kind of
pt ydta.etrics pr . supposes, .. R.icoeur is quick to point out , a total
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ob 1ect ificat ion of t he 1ndivid.....l. It presents ua with au individual as
he appear s t o ano ther and bloc:u UI of f f rOlll r eaching the actual movement
of inner life whI ch is symptomatically exp r es sed I n the " sign s" whi ch the
e t hol og i s t must r ea d in order t o pa int h i s po rtrait . Ther e is "no d iB eern-
ab le r elat i on be tween the ' I wi ll' and a psyeho gr aph whi ch is only t be
por t rai t of the ot he r ." (FN, 358) . Besides, th e objectification of
'charac t e r ' mus t forego - ... c:h 1. t he rigorous deaaoo of scteeee - all
t ho se r ev eal l llg aetaphors vh1 c:h ordinary l.anguage -ploys in it. effo r t to
r ea ch t hrough t o the 1ndiv1o:lIal ' I' - _ tapbo'u like ' deep ' and '~per-
fiel&1' , 'outgo1Dg' and '¥1thdraWll'. 'WXMl.y' and ' ev en - eelllpe r ed ' , .etapOOr s
whi ch give aoae i nkling of subjective ' character '. Sc i ence r e quire s a fa r
grea ter 8CotlOlaY than or dinary l angu age penitl ltlelf to have. Ethology
tries to r each the i ndividua l by mean s of a sc ient ifically limited numbe r
of very gener a l pr ope rt i es. For exampl e, t he ' ne rvous ' type . in t he Dutch
syst _ . i s ch aracterized by a cOllbination of emotivi t y , non - activi t y and
priaarity ; t h. ' ph1e patic ' t ype is arrived a t by uniting non -eeothity.
ac t iv:l.t y and s econd ari t y . Such ay s ttsatizaUou IIllU S of e t ho logy "a
tributary of aental phy sic. t o which ••• free willi ng suc cumbs ." (n , 359) .
It prevents us fraa r e lat ing II char ac t e r !I:2!. directl y to the freed.aa of
the~. It behooves us then - i n our ...bitious drive t owa r d.
su bj ectivity - to see if we cau eser ccee the duali ty of t he two points
of view , f o r the met hod of e t ho l ogy nec essarily force s that s cience into a
tota lly determ inilltic moul d , even to t he ex tent th a t the e t hological f ormula
mus t sOIlIehow include free dOQl iUelf. Even if t he ethologist hiIIself .9.!!!.
man be lieve s otherwise , ~ sc i e nt ist , " ev e ry t h i ng oc cu rs.!!....!!. t he
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individual could be reduced t o his ova por t rai t and hh portrai t to his
e t ho l ogi cal formula", (PN, 363) , which is not , at th 1l s ta ge of the sc ience ,
nearly c-.plete , bu t which is ....sceptible t o t otal elabor at io u , t he ac i eutist
thinks, as lIKlre and DOre discoveries ar e made . "iain , as has been s t r e ssed
befor e , Ri coeur' s contention i s t hat "d etera!nisa is eit he r s l l or no t s t
all . " (d . ibid. ) ; t hus , the r elation "etveeu!!!!. character-type , on t he
one ha nd - th e e t hologiat' s "e ae ra tion1." - - and !l ex1l t ent ial freed OCll ,
on t he ot ber, lSU.t be r e- ezam:1ned if e t ho l og y is t o H rve a. a diagnostic
of "e xpe r i en ce d character", t hlt . dmit t ed ly f lee t ing expe r ience wher ein t he
nexu s be tweeu !I: clar ac t er tnd .!I. freedOlll_,. be locat ed.. It c ert ainly
cannot be located wi thin t be " i nt er s t i ce. of determinism" f or the se ere ,
as has bee n ind i cated, t he abs tract inven t ions of ps)'Chologi sts . We can
fiDd t his nexu s only within a con te xt of subject i vity .
Deac ription r ev ea l s .,. charac ter to ae not a, a cla ss or co l lect ive
"type", s tatis t icsll y e s ta blbbed by an e t hol ogy , but a s lIy unique and
in.ill1table self . Al though t he ".pell of object ivity" inveigles lie into
l118i.ing a g_e out of e t ho l ogi cal portraiu and in serting myse lf i n to one
of isolated, abs t r ac t t r aits re ndering me a s a uervoua , phlepat ic or ot he r
"type" but that lIy charac t er 11 nothing ec re or l es . t han "this individual
who I .... (PH, 368) and 8(l irreducible .
A paradox iDmedi ately .... erges when one see. cha r a cter f rOCll t his
pe rspective . My cha r ac te r ii, in a . en s e , a l so IIY~ -- i t is lily ve ry
uat.u re (or , part of it, a t any r ate) which I cannot chan ge witho ut bec OllIlng
au "o ther" , aDd ye t I do ..ke lIyH lf , as i t wer e , t bou&h rithin lIy own
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l imits . The Sa r t r ea n mot , "Existence prec edes es sence" has some t ruth
within i t. While my character situa tes me and In divldu all:::es me, I sense
that I can use or abuse i t , as I choose . My character s erves as t he back-
~ against which I do whatever I do. In phenomeno logieal r enn a , while
Illy ch aracter determines t he~ of my a ctions, it does no t detel"lllJ.ne t heir
intention. The style --- the permanent; ' 'modus ope randi " - -- whi c.h is "mine"
(or "thine " ) says notbing abo ut; which motives I wi ll va l ue most highly or
which habits I wi ll f orm . The re a re impottant impl ications fo r ethics and
ed uca tion in thi s understanding of 't he bond between t he absolute involun-
Ca ry , which 1s my cha racter and the relative involuntary of desires and
othe r motives and that of capabilities and habits . Ricoeur says:
I deal ly ( that is, apart frODl passions which are truly con trac-
tions of t he soul) and within t he l imits of t he normal , there
ar e no de s ires o r habits which cou ld not give way to disci -
pline ; but the very plas t icity of desites and habits and this
discipline can only be produced i n ag re ement wi t h the fo rmula
of de ve lopment. The finite and the i nfini te do not lhoit
each o thet: but are present t o each othet: and in each ofher ,
(FN, 369) .
By i tself , as Alain says , character entails "neithe r good nor evil,
neither virt ue nor vice, but r a t he t: an i nimitable and unique way of being
f rank or devious , cruel o r kind , greedy or generous. ,,28 Thus, a lthough my
cha racter as a changeless "given" is a kind of fate, it i s no t a determining
fa te with respect to my vo luntary actions. I cannot, as it were, b lame it
fo t: my foolishness o r credit it with my wisdom . While it is true t ha t "each
28 Alain LPseudonym for Emile Chartiei!, Pro pos su r 1 ' Educa tion ,
PaJ:'is. PJ:'esses Univet:sitaires de France, 1948 , p - 25.
I
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individual is born, l iv e s and dies according to his own na t ure . as t he
crocodile is a c rocodile , and that be changes no t at 811 . ,,29 it is equally
eme t ha t " i n any human body al l passions are possible, a ll e r rors are
possible ••• (a nd whi l e ) there are as many ways of being bad and unhappy
as t he r e are men on t he ea rth •• • fo r every man there is also a salvation
pecu liar t o him , of the same color, of t he same texture as he . ,,30
believe, Ricoeur says, that a ll values are somehow accessible to a l l
cha racter types . ''We must believe t ha t there are no minds exclud ed frolll
morality ; nor a re ther e cha racter t yp es which possess morality as a
na t ural righ t . " (FN, 370) .
Aristotle . long ago. made this point in contending against those who
would argue t hat immorality is no t a matter of one's own choosing. They
c laim that "we must be born with an eye for a moral issue whi ch wi l l enable
us t o fom a co r rect j udgment and choose what ia truly good. A man who has
this natural gif t is one of Nature's favourites . . • It is sOlllething which
ca nnot be acquired or learned. ,,3l This "na tu ral gift" of which t he y s peak
is that " cha r a c t e r " with which we a re de aling here. Aristotle mai ntains
t hat a man i s free to use his native dispositions for vice or virtue .
I t is true, howev er , one llIUst admit , that ce rtain character types ar e
more favourable t o the development of particular virtues or more susceptible
29 Ibid., p , 24
30 Ibid. , pp , 97-8 .
31 Arietotle , Ethics, translated by J . A. K. Thomson , Penguin Edition,
1955.BookThree,p .~
-,
.,
t o development of vices than are otber character types. Statistics_y
indicat e, f or instanca, that. "nervous" type has a great propensity to
lying . However, t he f requency of pe rformance indicated by • grO'.lp of
individuals within a ce rtain class canno t be eq ua t ed vitb t he t endency or
d i s position of one~ in t hat class with r esp ec t to lying. That
i ndividua l may j us t 's well be one of th e l es s-tlan- half who i s normally
truthful, although he wi l l be t rut hf ul "nervO\1l111y" . In any case , as
LeS eene points ou t , "the l ying of the nervous, favored by emotivity,
! tuleUvity and initiativlty, r epresents a poor us e of a sys t em of disposi-
tions whose good use la, f or ins tance, a wor k of art .,, 32
My cha racter , i n sho rt , doe s no t decenine lIle . Rathe r it Is the way
I n whi ch 1 de t.nine .,...If. It is my vay of thinking and no t wha t I
think ; it is T1l'f way of doing and no t what I do . It u. ". way of choosing
aDd of cboosing ."elf whicb I do DOt choose. " (FN, 368; empbasis aine) .
My choosing is basically unliaited - I UD " reacb for the s t a r s " - but
.,. .!!!I of choosinS provid.. tb e Iildt. My body , a t least, ..y cause _ t o
"s trike a picket f ence . " It is lIlY "nature" which i s Iblited and finite ,
and eakes III}' infinite freedDlll finite .
We bave sa i d , a t the be gi nn ing of this chapter , that ethological data
se rv ed as t he necessary propadeutic to t he discovery of t he necessity of
charact e r as expe rienced in the f irst peraoa , Itll >:eal va lue lies in
a llowi ns ua to come t o te1."lll.S with Illy "fa t e " I t o respec t an d even to love
32Renn~e LeSenne, Le Mensong. e t Ie CSfscdn, P, r i s, Aubie r . 19 30,
p . 186 .
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the immutable nature within me, to work with i t f or my gl or y . Unfor t unately,
pa s sion s intervene to objectify my cha racter and use it as a s ca pegoat fo r
my shor t comin gs . Whil e knowledge (of character types , for instance) can be
power (a po tential for deliverance f rom the bond of character). it always
is in danger £r01ll the " s pel l of objectivity" . Especially is t his so when
ethological s tat i s tics are hand led badly by educators s pe l l - bound by graphs
and charts. The educator's "knowledge" must be tempe red by what Rieoeur
calls "sensitivity" a nd what 1s nowadays often r ef e r r ed to as "empathy ".
(ct . FN, 372) . LeSenne s t r e s s e s t ha t this knowledge must no t on ly be used
f or grand psycho-ee.trd e des i gns, but fo r the providing of "a method of
sp iritual life in which knowledge would be based on sympat hy , i n order to
permit th e individual not t o find a j ob but to develop and ex tend himself . ,,33
E.~
We have tried, in this chapter , to enuntiate t he meaning of " car ac d !r e"
as lticoeur uses i t . We have fol lowed him i n hi s attempt t o employ t he
findings of a s cience of character in th e manner of a "diagnost i cs" t o
r ea ch t hat inner experience of character, as mine, in the hope that the
knowledge of my l imi t s would bring me to recognize them as t he medium of
my f r eedom, as the backdrop to my free agency i n the wor ld. A synthesis
of f re edoe and na ture was t he l imi t - i dea guiding t he whole phi l o sophi cal
ana lysis , a syn t hesis which would be "e ffec t ed in the act of consent, for it
33 R. LeSenne , op , ci t . , p , 325 .
-,
"18 in the ac t of con se nt tha t I acltDov l edg e t hat " 1 can only us e lay freedom
in accord wi th. finite , _ utable eede" , (FN, 369) . Onl y by 3D. act of
ccnuent t o .y l1a1tl can I be gin to ...1<e character - an<! all nec:e aaity
-- 111 own, so t ha t Illy s i tuated f reedom --- situated by t ha t fate whi ch Illy
cha n c t e r 1. aod t o which I _,. Cem. SIlC -- _,. be tr3lUlfonoed iDto ".
destiny . a voca tion" . (flf. 373) . Yet , a. we have seen , cOtUIent 11 alway.
on th e ve rge of be i ng sp ellbound and any 8yt1thesia is, pe rforce, • very
ptecar10ua one . tln1ty el ude. phenC*enol oa:ical I t _ap . it woul4 sea , and
we are obliged to IIllIfI5Ihal1 ot he r r e sour cea in our cont inuing sea r ch .
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CHAPTER I V
BEYOND PHENOMENOLOGY
A. OualiSlll Reborn
Throughout these pa ges , we have talked of an appar ently invi ncible
dua lism which understan ding presents i n any r eflection on t he relations hip
be t ween freedom and na t ure. We ha ve seen t hat th e ·' ,.pe l l of ob jectivity"
exe rc.izes itse lf in a breaking up of the initial, pre- reflexive ha rmony
which , we suspect , l ies be ne ath the epistetJic rupt ure , and we have r efe r r ed
several times to t he requireme nt of goi ng beyond psychologieal du ali sm to
f ind a " common s tandard " of f reedom and nature in sub1 ectivi ty . It is this
requirement which we see as r ef l ec t ed in or f ulfilled by the phe nomenol ogi ca l
" epoche", inherited f r om Husserl, which constantly t ranscen ds t he "natural
s tandpo int" wherein the body 1s expelled into the obj ec tive r ealm . I t is
th e r equ iremen t of recover i ng t he Cogi to in the first pers on. The nex us
of t he v ol un t ary and the i nvoluntary 1& not t o be fo und, we have said , a t
t he bound ary of t wo un i vers e s of discourse - -- one object i ve, the other
subjective --- but r a ther must be l oca ted "in the intuit io n of a body
conj oined t o a wi l ling which submits t o it.!!!!! gove rns i t " (FN, 10; emphads
mine) .
Howeve r, even in reaching this "intuition" -- th rough a pbenoee nc-
l og i ca l descJ: ip tion which takes practical life simply " a s it is g i ven" ,
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while u81118 the clue s provided by empirical sc iellCe t o reach t hr ou gh to
t hat expe r i ence of \ltIity whicb • true unde.rsUD(Ung of .!I. eha r aeter ~d
pertdt - we see. t o be oua ble t o ov erc(lClIe t he dua l i ty we sou gh t . method -
i cally, t o evade . In tryin g t o over COlDe one fo m of dua11sm, we have
l and ed in ano ther , mor e invinci bl e. [Dna. Description fuelf now appear s
t o hav e been t he aidv1fe of • new dlcbotcay . Des cription , i t turna out ,
11 .or e "a t riUlllpb of •• • distinction r a ther ttum • r euni t ing l eap" (FN.
34) fo r natu re -- t he in v i nc i ble characte r whic h Is my lllOde of freed om -
ever r emains ot her thao the wil l which cous ent s to it .
Desc ription . then, r e tains tbe postw:e of the specutor . In order
to r e ach tbe " boDd which 1n fa c t join. vil1ing to i t s bod y" (FN. 14) we
s ha l l have to go beyond des cript ion , s i nce de scrlpUOIl. r emains aD intellec-
tual analyl1 s of str uctures t o be und er stood. What I s requi r ed , i1.icoeu r
t binks , fo r a full ap pr eciation of the recip rocity of the volunt a ry and the
1Dvobmtary ia "a conversi on of tbov.ght which , turning it. back on holdiDg
clea r an d di.t1nct ideas at a diatance f re. itae lf , a tte-pt a t o identify
with t he definite experience of existence which i a lllyaelf i n a corpora l
a i t ua t i on . " (FN, 15) . r bia ia a con version whi ch " l eada f r om t he t houg ht
whi ch po aita concepts befor e itself to a thought whi cb pa rticipate a in
exist enc e ." (FN. 16).
8 . A Seco nd ' Copern i can Revolution '
Thia eeeveretee, furthel'\DOre , l eads ua be yond the fi ra t Copernican
R.evolu U on which " rea t or e . t o lJUbje cUvity it. due " (Ill', 31) and which
Ucoeur regard a .. " t he beginning of philosophy" (FN, 471) and it. " firat
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achievement" (FN. 5) . I t ca U a fo r a second Copernican Revolut i on which
woul d "d16place tbe center of r ef erenc e fr~ sub jectivity t o Transcendence" .
(FN, 472) . Now, lJUch • dlspl ac_nt - wcb a recour .. to Transcendence
- seems t o requi r e e lifting of the "epoche" whi ch ha a been imposed frOlll
the begi lJI11ng of Ucoeur' . phUoaopbiea l entellJrile which und ertakes to
perforw. a phenomenology of willing within phellOlaeuologic:al br acket! (p laced
aro und na tu r al1S111, ob j ec tivity and t he ' na t u\"al 8tandpoi n t ' ) end e i de t i c
brackets (enc: lod ua the uistent:Lal 'scc1de nu ' of tbe fault aDd of tnna-
ce ud en tal yuming). I nd eed. , K1coeur' . own plan 11 d eady enunciated. ; it
1. t o l eav e TTanscend ence aside until his "p oetic s" (c t . FN, 32) 18 pr es ented
in a projected t hi rd volu.e of his trUegy, Just •• he baa , iD fact , l e f t
t he f aul t adde until ita ap pearance in ht. ae ccmd voltme . Yet , the l ast
page e of I.e Vol on tair e e t L ' Involonta ire are conce r ned very much wi th
Tranecendence , and his juetif ication fa t invoking it i a no t e epecially ereer ,
Be doe s atticu!ste the ptobl_ (FN, 467) but leave. i t un $Ol ved . One cou ld
a lso cOIIlplain t ha t i t , t oo , l i ke the fa ul t , t ema i ns quite une xpl a ined --
l.e. , one 11 a t a loss to know quite what tbe authot tmdl' rstands by the
t em. Ooe aight f o rg ive hi-. f or this dinel Std fo t the r eader , silIC a the
' t ea lit ,. ' 11 t o be br acketed for rhe tiJa e being . however , t he mos t abrasive
difficulty is that, if we ate t o remain witbin the r ealm of a fundalllental
on t o logy , a e licoeut tmd erstanda it - an exaainat i on of t he key notes of
wi lling , i t a fundamental aeeuceweee --- and no t eneer the atens of meta-
physi c s, whenin the fault and Ttanscend en ce , siD and hope , _::- legitimately
enter , how can we i 06ett on e of these dime nsions nov! To what degtee 1s it
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pel"1lli88ible to introduce these notions into an allegedly circumsc ribed
psychology?
Whatever the answer t o t bb lllet hodo logical dif ficul ty, Ri coeur
Ins1sts t ha t if we are ever t o~ "the unity of man with biaself
and hi. world • • • phencaenolol1 (a ust be ) tran .c: eod ed by iii _t.physics . ..
(Flf. 467) , even thougb t here 11 __ $Ugge.tlOD. t hat , fo r Ricoeur , t he two
bracket ed phe ua.ena _, be. sa id t o be alr e ad y i nc l uded i n a psychology t ha t
seeks to conciliate freed Oil and na t ur e .
C. FrOlll Description t o Active Pa r t icipa tion
We shall l . ave the pr obl e. of ae tbodol08Y fo r t he ..-Bnt to purIN e.
with IJ.Coe>.Ir. t he eff o r t t o d b c over unity by _ ac tive partici pa tion in
...,. incarnati on . a iii ."stery" (n. 14) . Thb, a ga in , i . the language of
Harcel whose reflections on " I e co rp s propr e" provided the sp ringboa r d fo r
Ri coeur 'a own ana l ys es (FN, 15) although Ric oeur ' s intention is to "probl em-
b a" t he Har cell UI1 "mystery" , 1f tha t is possible , us ing Hus se rlian t e ch-
uiques , adapted to his own exbteuU...l purposes . This s c t i ve pa r ticipation ,
howeve r, doe s uo t , e i t he r , au ceeed in av erc-tng t.he c.aJ.pre seut dualit y of
understanding . Beneath the dicbotOllly which elIe rge. in and. _ to be
pr ovo ked. b, reflection, a dicbot. , which e1 .sssiClll philosophy would consider
s s final , there is , fo r Ri coeur, an ultm ate "le sion i n being itself" , which
on e must seek t o heal, in some manner . (ef. FN, 444).
Whi le it i s true that this "le sion" fir s t. ..nife a t s iUslf in the
se t of thinlt1ng - r ef lec tion se_8 t o pr oduce that dua l i _ which, fo r
t ha t r ea so n, .., be called "_tboclic dualism" - it. is also t he ease t ha t
so
the ac t of thiaking is t he Iloat fun damental act of human co n sc i ou sne.. and.
i t woul d appear , then, t hat the act of thinking which se ems t o shatter man
11 bu t a r eflection (as in • _t n or ) of a n ultimat ely onto logical di v1lion
in aan . In other word . , behiod the difficulty of underetandlng , t ben ii ,
pe r ha ps. an i rreconcilabl e pr actical hos t ili ty be tween "exper i en ced nec-
Ita s it, " and fr eed c..' s dea b-e . (d . FR, 347). The C~ propor t ion between
freed ca and natur e whi ch we hav e t r i ed t o find in a ce r tai n subj ec t iv ity
- finding 08ce ll81t y in the firs t peraon . a.~ character . for instance .
po ss essing that Jemdlligheit . t hat qua lity of 1II1ne-neal , of which Hddegger
makes a gr ea t de al , 34 - ...y be nothing IDOte than a detour a ro \lOd t hat
d{chorea,. wbi ch , on the l ev el of existence . s till r emai ns , t houg h SCIlae10Iha t
ea.ofLauged. 0I:l t he u:i8tent1al l ev el . t here se ees no way of uni ting
f reedOlll. and na t u re , for t hey lee. totall,. inco.-pat ib le, aa au t ual l)' Della ting
ea ch other . Nec es s ity appea rl , when one tries to gr aap it, as a negation
of f1::eed om; and whatever freedom 1 seem to ha ve emer ges as a struggle ag a i ns t ,
a negation of, the nec e s sit y which is withi n me and outside ae , An under-
standing of ne gation i s t hus essen t i a l f or s n ap preciation of what i nc arnate
freedca reall)' 18 .
D. Fr eed ca and Ma t ur e Mutua l Nega tions
On the one hand, ne ce salty always app ears as an ac t ive nega tion , t he
nelll~sis, of f reedOlll. Whatever makes Ille "particular " limits me and pr e sents
34 Kar tin Heid egg e r , Bein g and Tbe , op. dt. , p , 68 .
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the possibility of my non-b e i ng . While I accept my uniqueness and my
i rreplaceability, I look , i n dread , to my impen ding death, when I wil l no
longer "count". when I wi ll be as if I had never been. Whatever pa r ticular
decision I make implies i ts own "bec au se-of" or "i n-Older-to" and it is
the pr edominance of one lIlOtive over the other tha t pr e c i pita t es this choice ,
rather than that; every choice , L,e , every culmination of a de ciding process
which occ ur s in space and time , implies some ece.rve whi ch has bee n considered
and discard ed. Eve ry movement I sake is governed. to a greater o r l e s se r
ex tent . by t he deg r ee of res i stance of my body.
On the other hand, freedom always appears aa a patient negation of
nece s s ity . 1 r e f u se ne ces s i t y . 1 announce a definitive "no" t o t ha t which
is undeniable. I will not l et myse lf be bound down by i t s limi tations.
Every choice is an implicit "No" to what could be other alterna tives; it
c01llll.its me to a certain pa rticular way-o f-b ei ng in t he world which precludea
other waya . Eve ry effort, in voluntary action, ill a fo r thright r e f uaa l t o
be t he victim of my bodyts inertias and emotions - -- thia sometimes stubborn
refuaal i s , indeed, the very heart of effort.
Negation is , thus , bipol a r . It i s negation undergone and negat.ion
overcome -- i t is non -being suff e r ed by f reedom. and the refusal of non -
be i ng posited by f reedom. Once freedom. i s born t.o itself , it app ears as an
active negation and as having already bee n negated. The Cogit.o i s bot.h
action and passion . 35
35 cf . Jacques sa ea co , "La Rikiprocit€ du Patir et de l ' Agi r" , i n
Etudes Phl1osophi9ues , 10 (1955 ), 726 -9.
"To see t hb do ubl e ne gation i n eeree of the necessity which Is Illy
ebeeecce r , we wi ll inquire i n what s ense we lIlay say that hav ing a character
1• • negati on of f reedOll. . We have described character as one of freedom ' .
~ of heiDi . a. ODe of tbe vay . whereby I .. finite In t be es ee c r ee of
., freedOlll. lIOOI , it Is the infinite , r a t he r t haD the t inits , which firat
INgg es t. negation t o us , at l u st in on U nary I..nguage. By lly character.
I am S<:I:IIeth1n&. I 811 de t erllllDat e - I 811 • positive 8OIleonl!! inCCIlIlpar ably
di stinct frolll an other eeeee ee e , None thel e s s, it is ebb ve ry f a c t of
be i ng a someone tha t bespeaks a neg a t ivi ty , fo r it announce s t hat I 8IlI !!2!.
t he other. Baving . charac t e r 11 a negation of a ll otberne.. . Eve ry choiee
I _ lte intensifies this particularity and aalt&. ae IIOre and ac r e not-otber .
Of al l the possibilities t hat are open , .. i t ee ee , t o t he totality of
huaan e:II:perlew:e , only ;l very few ar e open to ee , One particular choice
close s off cO\lnt less other po s sible ejctce e , I n t he fil181 sna lyli s , 1 ca n
be no other t han myse lf - I ca nno t be t hee , or him . Each of my cho ices,
U1 the ver y dbruption and clodng-o ff of dec idon. 11 an exe I us den ,
"On the r oad fr ()lll. the po..i ble t o th e ac tul lie an I , ru in ed hopea
and a t r ophied powera . How lIUCb lat en t b.....nit' I " at rej ect 10. orde r to
ba IIOaeOne ~ " ( nt , 447) . For t he ~oleseetl.t. t here b so much that he van t s
t o beccae , in bb desire t o "b e s omebody" , bu t vhi ch he v ill nev e r be. For
the old man , ther e i s so IIlUch t ha t he want ed t o do but ha a no t aecOlllpli she d .
The familia r vicea of j ea louly and resentment suggest a U t oo c lear l y the
in ev i tabl e l aw t ha t I am on l y ''me'' when I would va n t to be "cche c-itbsn-ee' ",
"It i l eceet tae e unbear able to be unique, i nbi tabl e and condemned t o
r ea _ble onl, _, . a l £. " ( PM, 448). The vi ce s t hat develop out of this
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terror -- resentmen t , ha t red and j ea lo usy --- are instances of freedom's
initia l " no" of r e f u sal. They are ciphers (to us e a Jasperian term) of a
denial of the l imi t a tions of character as well as of the "hidden" motives
of th e uncon s c i ou s (if one may label uncons ci ous drives as motivea) and t he
con t ingencies of one 's pa rticular l ife . They point t o one 's intolerance of
l imi t at io ns an d, at f i rst glance , appear as a kind of affirmation of sev-
ere1gofty over •• • • r ather than ss r e f uss la of ••• • "The disguised form
of r e fu s a l is the ha ugh ty affinnation of consciousness ss absolute , that
i s , a s c r ea tive or as se lf-prod ucing . " (FN, 463) . I t is the wish fo r
to tality transformed i nt o a deceptive choice whi ch would ignore t he indi-
vidual's indivi dua lity and the l imi t at i ons which make him a man. "Fr eed om
th i nks H i/elf Promethean , and thus becomes i t. " (EN , 464) . I t is akin to
t he wi sh for total t ra nsparence whic h would ignore th e deep recesses of
man 's unconscious being . These forms of r ef u sa l mark off t he acment of
most extreme tension between the voluntary and the .involunt ar y and it is
f rom this adamant refus al that consent must be wrested, if consent i s to
be at all .
E. From Refusal to Conse nt
The re a re, then , two possibilities open to one in the face of
necessity - - - re f usal and consent. But the act of consent -- this saying
of a "y es " to the inevitable and overcoming the initial "no " --- seems t o
betoken a ca pitulation. The other option seems t o reduce freedom to a
word. Ref usal , r ej ec t i on , scorn and defiance offer attractive avenues for
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what _ ld see:.:. to be the highes t exp ress i on oJ: f r eed..: I will no t let
. , s elf be hide-bov:nd by atIy nec e ssity . Dl t :laa t al,. , the -olt total ac t o f
f re eda. would be ev i denced , one feels . in the ae t of fl\ l c:1d.e whi ch emerg e s
a. "the highes t con secra t ion of that ac t of ruptur e intr odu ced by con sciou s -
ness". (rN , 466) . It 18 • ca r ry ing of tbe "no " to ita .oa t lIubl I.e pitch
- the freely-performed denru c:tion of , and mas t ary ove r , the situation,
ove r life i t se lf . POt that l ife can appe ar .a t otal ly absur d, vile and
baae , f re e zi ng th e duality i nt o perma nence . But I can ce as e being a s l ave
to my bo dy. th e master. by dest royi ng th e master Bnd exer ci z l ng a mastery
of Illy own Cagit o . I t an a l so, wi th l e s s finality and l ee8 drlllllll , seek.
Inll~c: ease f r <Q anot her form of s l aver y , t ha t t o Illy paradox-ridden r ea sonilll
pove rs - I ean c(lIIIIli t wha t Camus call a "philosophical su i cide" . by
escaping int o the d lv l1l1ty vh:1ch f aith ptesenu . 36 But both of these
s tances a re , as f ar as I.1coeur i s concerned , not vic to r i es , but ev a s i an s ,
es ca pe s. The r e i . another posture possible - s posture of patient
cou r age in t he f ace of t he sbsurd , a cours ge which . r ef u se s both fOBS of
su icide - bo tb evasi ons - i n o r de r to continue t o face t he res pan a i-
bUity of f reedOlll, t o a ff i nl a different kind o f " no " , a " no " t o t he non -
be ing of ne ces sit y , which i s but to say "y e a" to nece lait y itself aa be ing
" t he r e" and binding lie .
I n short , just a s ev e r y cho i ce is an 1.IIIpllc it "n o" to other po s sl-
bilities and eve ry eff or t 1& a refusal to be hemmed in by a recalc i trant
36 ee , Albe rt Camus, The Myth of Si syphus, t r ans lated by Ju stin
O' Br i en , New York, 1955 .
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bod,. so ev ery eeeeeat is born of t he iD.1t ial refu...l of the U ait1ng:
cood lt1oaa of t he huraf.n dtu.t1oa - t he so rrow of • finitud e which 11
l.aposed on me by m, eba r ee eer , t he sorrow of fonie . sn'u which one suffers
in vir tu e of th e unconsc ious and. t he so rrow of con t!n&encl and dread -
and ul t illla t ely of dea th - which 11 the lot of humani t y bom in a partic:-
uiar rUle and place and c1rc\II..c::rlbed thereby . (d. FN, 447- 66) .
However . the event of cho ice i s lIlOt'e t han a t enlin a t i on or a resoluti on
of a debate; it a l s o " genu inely inaugurates the pr oj ect as a s impl e intention
of pure action ." (FN, 164) . Tha t event 1s simu ltan eo usly a "no" to the
resolu t ion of a proc e l s and. " ye ll" t o t he burating f o r t h of a nov e l ty ---
i t 18 tbe pr ac tical r econ ciluUon of t he ba rbon e.! pa radox of co ntinuity
aDd disc.on t inuity in t be de c1aiou...... k.ing proce.. . a _ 11 aa of tbe ver tical
pa r adox of t he invol~ntary ao t i ve and the voluntary project (d . FR, 168).
Si.a:lhrly, the effor t t o overce:ae bodily mere!... in a cting aDd t he COS1to ' s
Deed t o conquer t he bod y , a t l u at IIUf fic i eu tly t o ..k.e t hought possible,
11 oll.1y one aide of vol~ntary 1IIOVement ; t here 11 alao the apon t an e i t y and
d1lponibility37 of t he pre-fonPed s ldUs, like t he in.cinetive co-ordination
of s i gh t and t(NCh, and of babita , which free t he will frOll preocc~pation
with means and allow it to concentrate on encb . Even emotioo.a - such aa
wonder and shock - - are seen . by Ricoe~r , as organs available to the
vol~ntary , r ather than a. l118ater. ove r i t • .u effor t 11 a negat i ve i nd ex ,
so the organs of effort s pea k a "y es" t hat posit iv ely ove rcOIIles.
37 The French t enl "diBponibili t l!" suggesta so adequa t e ly t he notion
of • COII.plet e av.il.bility .nd openness that I have dec ided to us e a t rans-
lit erate neologiSlll to r ende r it into English, which doe s not have a co rres-
ponding eere ,
"The que .tiou t hat ari&ea, t hea, i a this : I s • "yes" possible in tb e
bee of the 8 e ldelleran~.38 t hat particularity to vbicb free-
etc. ' , prbaary respon se 11 • r e SOUDding "no " ! What. i n any case. would i t
MaD t o say " ye s " an d doe . t be af ftt1U.tive pr ooou nee-ent w ece ed in
r e storiDg a unity betwe en tb . aan who I s consent ing and the IMn possess1nB
tbe c:har ac t er t o which he con l en t B! Does it re store the broken-up uni ty
between lIIan and b1lllself and his world?
F. FrO#l PhenOl<lenology to Metaph ysics
For Ricoeur. a philosophiesl psychology will never s ucc eed in
r eaching that unity of which we spea k and f or which we sear cb . Admi ttedly ,
thi s unity i , ano ther of Il1coe ur ' a aSSUlI.p t l ona, made i n vir t ue of tbe
suggestivene ss of t he .ytbs of innoeene e whi ch will provide fod der fo r his
Sl'!!bol1gue du Kal . Aa we have said earlier. phetlOUollOlogical eidetic• .use
be t rlllUlcended by • ae t aphydc:. vbich woul d ca.e t o grips wi th the f aut
aDd with TY8Il.SCend eru:e. ¥b l eh ..at be br a cket ed i n tbe searcb f or a fUDds -
aeDtal on to l ogy . the nece.u.ry pr elude t o a t o t al an tbropology. What
I.1coeur BeeCIS t o be <loing in tb e Unal pages of I.e Volontaire et
L' I nvo lont air e 11 ~vinl th e way fo r a consi de ra tion of t he faul t in bis
se co ru:l volUllle , Fini t vde e t Cul pabUite, and Tr an s cend en ce i n a'll as yet
unpublished. "poetic s" of hop e. Ri coeu r <loes not , th en , r ea l l y abandon his
guiding pr inc i pl e , t he "p rimacy of conciliation over paradox " , (FN, 34 1)
- - the traditi onal assumpti on of the du alism of th e voluntary and t he
38 Heide-gger . op. cit. , p . 174 .
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involuntar y 1. not, he would aver, th e final word , bu t th e ove rcocrlDl o f
tb b dualis.. canno t b e aeh i ev ed without invoking the ont olog i ca l dinlensiona
of the fa ult and of Tra nse end ene e.
The choice of the "y e a" in the act of consent - and it h a cho i ce
ova l' r efusal - :h a choice involving bo th of t bese dime ns i ons . It Is a
dlO l ce , £11;"81' of a l l , Ri eoe ut' elaa. , with r es pe ct t o t he f au l t. What he
s eems t o 1lIeaD. is that this ch oice b>plies the deet.ruetdcn of the wiah for
t o t ality llDd is t hereb y s eeere..iOl1 that t he fa ul ted huaao. ccmdition is
t o be t aken into ac c ount . sinc e it 18 that conditi on which c.on t t'ad i c t s the
wish fo r t ot ality . At the _ tilDe , the cho ice of the "yes" t ends t o
s t r i p cons ent of .11 i t a vo lunt ary ove r tone a and reduce it to an as aeot t o
a f act . Cous en t oscillates , a8 it were , be t ween the desire for total
h'eede- and the de sire t o l i ve up, t.o lay down a~. to cap i tulat e . t o
r eturn t o slavery (cf . FN, 466) . The i n t rudon of the f au l t d r ags one
INay f 'rl* on.e eJ[t 'reme , t.ha t of volun t a 'riSll, to the other , that. o f seeee-
.1nism . ll.1coeur ' lI ambit ion 111 to trao sc end both . 39
The cho i ce i n consent a lso i nvolves Transcenden ce . I n o r de r to
jus tify the "ye." of consent. one ba. t.o d iaeover w etber the lm iverae
itself , whi ch 18 the t eminus of consent, 111 th e sort of place wher e fr eedom
is not but • air age. If the world i s . IItag e were freedOlllmay play, if
t he wo'rl d i s soaehow~, then t o ecaeeet; doe s DOt iJaply giving up one 's
freedom; all the wor ld be COllles my s tage . I can t hen say t ha t. this world
39 d . Fann y Eps t e i n , "Be yond Detemini8ll and Irra t ional iSlll", in
Philosopby Toda y , 11 (1967) .38- 46 .
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i • • wor ld designed, in _ sense, for .e. I t b , 8S i t were, a t Illy
dilposal. Thus . 1 do no t de ny t he wor ld . I adopt i t. I do not give i n t o
it ; I ac quiesce i n i t. 1 make use of it in Illy service and i n th e service
of otber ••
B.1coeu r concl udes t ha t a phi l osophy of the _bject . engaged 10 .s a
first Cop ernican Revo l ution , can be completed onl y to the ex t en t t ha t on e
performs a philosophy of Transcendence . All t ha t has gone be fore is a
prelude t o a "poetic.". ADd he r ead ily adaits that t hi . involve' a t eU
" I M p" , llODevbat i n th e IQ.Dner of the Car te sian methodic progres.ion f ro:-
de fian t doubt t o .elf- affirma t io n a.nd fJ:'olll self-aff i rma t i on t o the a f U rma -
tiou of God which wi ll allow bJa . ult imauly . t o r eafUl"II the world and the
body , vhich he bad hitberto '"braCke ted" , Ricoeur does not propose to
perform t his ea eee aee in t he f irst vo l..- bu t s impl y vi, be . t o sbow . by
t aking what he r e ga r ds aa tWO i nad equate phi l oso phies of Trans c end en ce, how
such a philosopby provid.e a t he geno fo r a r econ cili a t i on of f r e ed.-. and
ceeeeee , we bav e M i d.. os c i llatea between two po les - t he desire
fo r tota l fr eedom, whi ch would riae grand l y abov e t he IIlUndanities of ex i s -
eeece , and a tot al capitulation t o nece s sity. The f ir.t i . reflec ced in
tbe StoiC a t t i t ude of total detsct-nt whi cb professes 8eOn1 of a ny r e s t ric-
t i on ; t he s ec ond 1IIay be seen in the Orphic t euclen cy to lo se oneself by
ilImersion int o t be Ot he r . An ana lysis of t hese appr oac hes t o t he i nvinc ibl e
b employed t o a r ticulate tbe point t ha t any con ciliation can be found. only
in a "con.Ueration of the totality of the world , not. t o be sure, a s
lmowledge, but a. a cipher of Tr anscendence. " (FH, 469) .
"Sto ic detac~t i . belt epltOlll.1red in Epie-tetua ' dic tUIII t hat " of
all t hings . ~ are in OUT pavel'. others are no t" and. .-oag tbe " o t be r s"
11 ., body. lli eoe ut' quote. lUreus Aure lius as _11 .a Epietetua t o Ulus -
trate t he "S t oic IIn_tegy " (ihid.) which sees t he bod y 8. inert . as a
t hina . and s ees effort excl usively as ne gative, .a a s t russle agai ns t
r ea l etance. On the o t he r ha nd, the Sto ics re s t ore t o t he body - and t o
.11 nece a81ty - • val ue t hat 18 pos i tive, f or nece s ai t y taken~
can be l oved and ado r ed . AI Ricoeur indicates , " t he change which rends
each object an d my insignificant body is sl,lrmounted an4 preserv ed in t he
suba tance of the whole." ( rN , 470) . This, of ecu r se , ii, i n no way , t be
union of IIl& D that we se ek. It i . r ather t be wi t hdr awing of th e 80u l into
{t Mif . detaching i tlelf froa partleular passing " t hi ng s " . i ncluding t he
bod y , in ord er to eon tezaplat e , in ado r a t ion , t hat div1uJ.ty which lIl&ybe
found i n th e t otal order . Thu., while the St oic con sent t ha t l ose s i tself
in • pan-th eiSla i . not qui t a th e se OI'll of the "b lack ex1 l t en tial1.." of a
Rletszcbe , i t i s s t i l l a non-iJrvolvl!lI.ent with the corpore al. I t aauages
to save itself f rOlll i tl suicidal t endencie s only by a r everent adlll1r a U oo
for t he ineffable Whol a .
The value of th e StoiC ccacep t of th e Whol e liea , fo r J.1coeur, in
evolting s eToug ly the notion of transcendence. i n ....gge .ting that I lIIII not
th e cente r of being. i n he r aldi ng the second Cope I'llican Revol ut i on . whi ch
1& a leap frOlll existenc e (1.e, f r Olll sub j e c t i v i t y) to Tra nscendence. Once
I di sc ove r t hi s Tr sn sc end ence. I will no l onger " con sent" for I will no
l onger be " free". There i s s ome sugg es t ion in J as per. ' writi ngs tha t if
Tr anscendence wer e r ev e aled to us directly . we shou ld not be ab le to be
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be free fo r Trausceooence would d_ i na t e u s cOII-pletely. 40 A discov ery of
Tranac eooen ce would l ea d us , R.1coeur t hinks, to admiration, not onl y for
the Whole , bu t, i n the Whole , t he little peculiari t i es as well . Stoicism
is doomed t o r emain "on the thre sh old of the poetry of adoration", (FR,
473) , to be fo rever an "imperfect co ns en t " . ( FR. 469) .
O1:philllll. on the other haud - es pecially that l yr i c Or ph! 8lII of
Goethe , iiI... aDd Nietzsche - is • fOnl of consent at t he o ther end of
t he spectl'\llll. This lat ter-day Orphi_ is the "byperbol1c eeaseet;" (FJI,
473) vb:1ch ...taerges t he Cogit.o in the intozicaUon of the c~. "Db
and becoae !" Dea th . and with it . 11 necessi t y , can be eveeeeee i n t he
" s ong vb:1c:h conjures up and ce l eb rat es ". (iN, 474). The gr ea t Orphic poetry
- Ri lk.' . Sonnets to Ore phe .... , in pa rtlcl,1s J' - "sings o f the pact of
freed Ollland nece s sity, of lIIy••lf as f ervor and of natwre as a miracle ."
(FN, 416 , n , 26) . The temp t a t ion of Or phism, indeed , is to lose on.ae lf
as subj ect ivit y a l together , to tend t owar d s a "na t ur e worship in which the
uniql,1e s t a t u. of t he Cogito eva por a t es in the cyc l e of the aiDer a l and the
am.al. " (rtf , 416 ) , in t he aanner of t be psycho logy of bebaviOl1rbtic
orientat i on . Orphi_ teud. . t o _ tlmO rp hize ad.i ra t io n int o aUenation . To
r es ist this t ...ptation, there is a need t o r e-exaaiDe t he dialectic between
t he Cogito in t he first per~ll and Transcendence o f which the Whol e - t he
!Jniverse - i a an index . !Jl tiaate co nsent mus t r eta i n both the Cos ito and
t he Whole. The CoSiro must appropr iat e both Stoic co ns en t - which gi ve s
40 et , Karl J a spers, Philosophy, transhted by E. B. Ashtotl , Chicago ,
!Jlliverdt y of Chicago Pr es s, 1969 .
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it an a s s ur anc e of s ove r e i gn t y - and Orphic: consent - which gives it
t he imp etu.s t o r e cognize (an d t he r eb y t o " ador e" ) t he I 1Ddts of t h a t
s ove r e i gn ty .
The va l ue of the Orp hic: ap proach - we cannot sa y " con cep t ". fo r
Orph lslll. I I poetI'J' and 18 ve iled in myth - Ues in its evouUon of bo th
tb e f au l t and Tr ana c:end enc:e . cc ce en e , we have sa id , .,1,lBt be ¥ru t e d f r Olll
r e f usal - it I s a ne ga tion of a ne ga tion and thus a " primary a ff i n:>aUon" .
to us e Nabe r t 's ph rase again . !law. r ef usal I s • d.fianc e and de fiance
speaks of fa ult. Cons ent lapliea a pa tient aceep t en ce of my faulted
con d i tion. Ref u. a l i s, ". 110 , a r e j e c t i on of t he Othe r and co nsent 1mpl1 e a
an ac t of humi lity before Divinity , e:l<prea.ed i n t he " avowal" of ain,
whi cb , i n L ' 1Iolme 'dUt bIe , will be no lOftIe r on th e periphery , and in a
continuing a c t of hope in • fu ture reconciliation . It 1a t his hope which
can conv e rt all hos t i l1ty , a ll refusal , into what l1coeu r think, of as ,
" f r a t ernll1 t ension within the uni t y of c reation . " (FN, 481).
sa
~
TO....ARDS A HERMENEUTIC OF EDUCATION
A. Philosophy and Pedagogy
In this final chapter we will suggest how Ricoeur's eidetic
description of a freedom within limits and of a proper appreciation of
"necessity in the first person" !pay be applied in the working out of a
bermeneutic of education . We take " educ a t i on" to refer to any structured
process or system which proposes to provide students with the necessary
wherewithal to enable them to make discriminating j udgments with respect
to the Ufe situations they will encounter. Education is, thus , a human
endeavour which takes as i ts aim the making of men, the building of the
human community. Every emerging generation t akes on the challenging role
of bUilding society anew and it Is With t hi s direction in mind that an
educator must make available to children the neces sa ry complex of information
and the appropriate network of experiences to assist them in beccenng
responsible adults. As Canadian educator, Donald Vandenburg, puts it,
"although the ac tual pu rposes of pedagogy may be very specific within daily
lessons, its real aim i s the development of a person who no lo nger needs
pedagogic assis tance. ,,41 A hermeneutic of education would attempt to
4 1Donald Vande nburg. " Exi s t entia l Educating and Pedagogic Authority".
in Philoaophyof Education: Proceedings. 1966. p , 109.
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interpre t t h e un derlying meaning (" e i do s " ) of t hi s pedagogic process by
working out a viable anthropology and by examining the various practical
approaches to e duca tion i n the specific contexts in which it intends to
achieve its objectives . Such a henneneutic would take account of whatever
scientific evidence is available, using it i n a diagnostic fashion to he lp
us ccee to grips with th e nature of man and with what is fundam entally
involved in the making of men.
We take it as axiomatic that any philosophy wbich is a philosophy in
what we may regard as t he full and traditional meaning of t he eere must,
peercece , have within it a philosophy of educ.ation . 42 Particularly
pertinent to education will be any philosophy which purports to he an
anthropology, or at least, the "grundlegung" for such an an thropology .
well-known historian of phenceeno I o gy , Herbert Spiegelberg, has said that
Ricoeur's work is perhaps the greatest promise for the fulfillment of an
authropology43 and it is our contention t hat Ricoeur's entire philosophital
pilgrimage is a search for an understanding of man . This is particularly
evident in his attempt to resto;e that unity which is so patently broken
and which is at best elusive and at wor s t beyond recall, but which he sees
as being partially available to our vision in a pre-philosophical e" pe r i ence ,
42 We a r e using the word "philosophy" here to refer to a search for
fi ra t principles and for wisdom, rather than in the more restricted,
non -normative sense in which it is used by most Anglo-AJnerican philosophers
of the snalytic persuasion.
43 i n Pfl;lnde r,op. ciL, p. 35.
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articulated in so many symbols and myths.
It is beyond the scope of this present study -- and would, perhaps,
be impossible, in sny event --- to proceed directly frOlll Ricoeur's
philosophy of t he will to a total educa tiona l philosophy . But if we cannot
nail down any dir"ct linkages between a philosophical idea and a pedagogical
practice, we can se ttle for something less formal --- let us call it an
inclination , a presumed direction in education being pointed out to us by
Ricoeur's ph i l os ophi ca l orientation. Thus, we can look at the eidetic
adumbrations in Freedom and Nature to pinpoint a number of indieations
which should be accented in educatfcna I theory and practice. I t is a l so
beyond our scope to take account . in sny more than a peripheral way . of
Ricoeur 's later work in which he sets about to effect t h e transition from
the eidetic and empiric stages to the more genuinely anthropological stage
to be reached in a projected poetics. In any case , it must be remembered
that Ricoeur 's pilgrimage. of which we sp oke , is still incomplete. Our
own task , therefore. is not to present any kind of blueprint fo r educational
pursuits but r a t he r to suggest how one approach to an understanding of ean
may be examined for the inBights i t provides for those involved in the
business of unders tanding the man that the child is to become.
B. Educational Theory and Praxis
A study of Ricoeur's variegated writings of t he past thirty years
reveals that for him the fundamental and most trenchant philosophical
experience i s the consciousness of man as a broken un ity, " l ' homJlle
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faillible" . Nowhere 16 this more evident than in his major enterprise , a
philosophy of human freedom, wherein Ricoeur ' 5 motivation is a search for
a conciliation, a healing, of this fracture. This pursuit does , indeed ,
turn out to be a " t as k" - -- it can never be coapLet.ed excep t "in hope snd
in an eschatological age" (FN, 21) -- but Ricoeur fee.1s that the attempt
mus t be carried on . Thus, in terms of the two aapec t s of the voluntary and
the involuntary on which we have focused in this essay --- consent and
character - - - unity can never be perfect but may be l egi t i mat eJy pursued
as a guiding " limit- i de a" . With respect to that character whi ch epitomizes
the totality of the nature which free ean must confront , consent as the
will rs act can neve r be total . There can never be absolute and pennanent
consent to the constraints of one's tempermament , fo r th ",r", is a continuous
oscillation be t we en the "no " of re fusal and the tentative "ye s " of patient
consent, Locating the impossibility of perfect consent in the persistent
evil and suffering ill; the world as we know it, Ricoeur suggests that while
one can " cons en t as much as possible" one continues to "hope to be
delivered of the terrible and at the end of time to enjoy a new body and
a new nature granted to freedom". (FN, 480).
Congruent with the experience of an ontological divisiveness in man
(dealt with through L 'Homme Fail1ible in a methodological framewo rd and in
Symboligue du Mal in terms of a henneneutics of symbols). there Is the
experience of another dialectic at the level of el<istence, evidenced in a
number of forms : seeing and saying , perspective and signification,
individuality and universality, subjectivity and objectivity; in short ,
all the numerous indications of the finite and the infinite. One of the
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manifestations of this existential dialectic which concerns us here is t he
apparent dramatic opposition between~and~. telescoped in the
familiar lament, "That's all very well in theory, but • . . n.
We have introduced the problem of the thearis-praxis tension for two
reasons: methodologically , ss an apologia for our attempt to t ranslate
Ricoeur's eidetic analyses into the realm of pedagogical theory and,
henoeneuticslly, to pinpoint the essential place of understanding in
educational practice --- the responsibility of educators to und erstand why
they do that which , in practice, they are about. The difficult project of
uniting thought and sc tion --- word snd work44 - in a cOIIBlIon storming of
the fort ress of the future requires of the educator the will to~
t he man the child is becoming. The attempt to restore the unity of III<In
operstes , on a f irst l evel, as a kind of propadeutic to the actual
~ducational process and will take the form of a continuous effort to
buttress action by theory, on the one hand , and to translate theory into
effective praxis, on the other. Thus, educational theory wil l not operate
in a vacl,lum, reeote from history and culture, and educational practice
will be established on foundations which will not collapse with t he next
passingstot'lll .
The man of our time is precariously balanc.ed on the tight-rope of
contemporary fallibility: on the one side , the abyss of absolute deteI'lll1nism ;
on the other , the quic.ksand of unmitigated freedom. "Unab le to reconcile
44 cf. Ricoeur 's essay , Work and the Word in HT, 197-219.
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freedom of choice and the inexorable limitations of nature" , contemporary
man vacillates between "8 fahe unlimited and unsituated freedom, and a
false determination of lIIaO by nature which reduces him to an object ."
eFN, 355). It is Ricoeur 's thesis that man is neither "detenoined" nor
"free"; he tries to femulate a conception of freedom "which 1!. in some
respect a nature" and a conception of na t ur e "which is an individual mode -
neither chosen no r modifiable by freedom - of freedom itself ." (ibid,) .
Han is thus profoundly divided within and, often, against , himself -- he
is fallible and conscious of his fallibility; he can eake the wrong
~ because he does not fu lly understand his motives; he is able to
sin by omission as well as by action and he can refuse to~ to what
he is by vainly trying to become an "other" or submerging himself i n a
cocoon in which all that happens comes about because of some "other" .
The pedagogue must come to know through the painful effort that is
cha r ac t eristic of all knowing wha t it means to be a man who is free and
e ff ec t i ve bu t yet un-free because he can be effective only within the
certain and well-defined l i mi t s which are his . He must be able to t ranslate
his understanding iuto the "be comi ng" of a person , s process which he . as
teacher, is presuming to abet. The anc ient philosopher, Heraclitus, refers
to the eternal struggle to understand " how that which is torn in different
directions comes into accord with itself - - - h at"mony in con t r a r i e t y . ,,45
45Heraclitus. Fragment 5 1 , in Die Ftagmente der Vorsokratiker (5th
ed.), translated by Charles H. Bakewell, Sour ce Book in Ancient PhilO!,ophy,
New York, Scribner's . 1907. p , 81.
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Victory i n t h i s s trug gle can be glimpsed ep hemera lly i n such disparate
cases as t he occ aafona j grace of a sup erlot" ska t e r or in t he f l eeting
harmony of human l ove .
Ricoeu r po i n ts up t hi s e ternal struggle --- the int er play betwe en
saying and doing , fr eedolll and t emperamen t , t heo ry s nd practice - - i n a
tribute t o Emmanuel Mounier I founder of the~ movement in France in
1932 and a pe dagog ue "par excellence". Ri coe ur ' s es aay , " Emmanuel Mounier:
a Persona l i st Ph ilosophe r " (RT. 133-161). por trays a 11180 of vision whose
pr eocc upation wi t h t he crises of his time led him to ab andon wha t he
r egarded as a r id a cadem ic philosophy (theory wi th out pJ:Bctlce). didactic
in style and gea red to an intellectual elite , to pu rsue what he was
ev en tually to describe as a "philos ophy of exis t ence" which essayed an
interpenetration of r efl ec tion and action - - a ph ilos ophy of an d fo r th e
market-place .
Ricoeur 's own philosophical bias is eVidenced by his own ded i ca t ion
to the~ movement, particularly by his collaboration with Mounier in
the publication of a still-extant left-wing joutnal , !!I!.!.!!., to which he
has contributed some of its best articles. Ricoeur certainly be l i eve s in
the efficacy of r efle cti on - - - reflection on the existential man , the
social and political man of his time ; indeed, the tenor of the seventeen
es s ays co llected in ilistory and Truth, all wri tten at different times and
in different circumstances , is th at of a pa negyric of the "wor d" . But it
is a word which " r ef l ec ts efficaciously and acts thoughtfully". (HI , 5).
For Ricoeur, it is "impossible to se t up a lasting and deep opposition
between theoria and praxis". (ibid .) . We may apply to Ricoeur h i ms e lf
"what be has s aid of Mol,1nier. that b. bas "dared to envisage , over and
abov e aU ae ac e-ie philos ophy •• nev civllir.atloll in i ta to tality." rsr ,
134).
Ri coeur ' s phil oso phy, t hen Is a contr ibution t o th e eterna l struggl e
of which Heraclitus spoke. It i a a ll. e ffo r t ttJlo/at ds t he achieviog of •
unity of aau. i n t e ras of th e freadoe--natur e dichotOlllY which _ tges
u-edla t ely on e r e f l e cu on th e h....n condition . I t b all. e..lII1nat ion of
thia eeeet cn , e specially within t he d imensions of conse n t to character,
t hat t he s econd level of our consideration lie s . Having s ugges t ed that
practi ce vitbout t beo :ry b dOQ1lled and ha ving s ug gea ted that ed u.utors ne ed
t o build t.heir edue. t la nd Itruc tuns all. fo un da tions whieh ~od)' a ll.
unde rstanding of man , we DIU nov lee wha t emer ge s f r om lticoe ur ' .
de s criptive ph enomen ol og i ca l ana l ys es of human f r eedOlll. Our effor t . thus
limit ed , is con sequently a IIIOst lIIodes t one in the f r 8laework of any t ot al
philosophy of ed ucation . Perhsps t he con t i nuing evo l u t ion f ra. a
descri pti ve - IlOr e-or -le" intuitive phenome nology t o a ..a re historically-
oriented one - - an evolution whi ch has iu ge nesis in Reidesaen 's~
~ - - - may pr ov i de th e in s pi r ation for a more t hor ough - goi ng
he:nDetleutic of ed uc a tion, but i t is a proj e t t f r augh t with dange rs,
i D881llUCh as a pr op er punuit of allCh a hermeneutic would r eq uire exp er t iae
i n a s tagge r i q nlllllber of disciplines .
C. The Uni gllene 88 of the Free Man
Fr eed c. , fo r &icee"r , is not the ce l ebrated freed o- of indif f e rence
ro
of the scholast ics or of Des c artea , whi ch "(llIli e. tb e b••te relation of
project to motive" (FH, 81) and "vhich I s no more t han an i apoll8 ible
indetermination of c:oa tenu of choice i n r elation t o t he contents of
-.o U VU " (FN. 187) . Rather , our f reedo. 1s what Ri coe ur o in b b fInal
ch ap te r of Fr e edom an d Natur e cal ls "an on l y hUlllllD freed_" (FN, 482ft.)
wherein " to wi ll i ' not t o crea t e" . (IN, 486) . It 11 •~ free<! OIl.
receptive t o conflicting va lues ; i t Is an i ncarnate fre edom, s ubject co
the resistances of • csc .leite.Dt body; an d it is • cont i ngen t f reedom,
con fronted by t he pa r t iculari ty of a charact er , the non-trans pa rence of an
unconscious an d the l ivens of U f e and dea t h . WhU e this f reedolll can be
Been as an image of abs ol ut e , cr e at i ve , heedOll. in iu powet of self-
de t e naina t i on , it 1_ o t he r than abs o l u t e in iu re ceptivity .
A Ilan i s f re e , th en , in this ccetexe , wi".hin t ha l1 mi U of his b\,llLlln
finitude . But t bes.:l H u t s ar e personal , his own, u:ui que . Spi ege l berg ,
in a recent essay on t he pr a ctlesl uses to whi ch phenomeno logy may be put,
r emin ds us that th e discov e ry of the ''Lebe nsvel t" l ead s t o "a Ilew se llse of
th e wonder an d digni ty of th e n crocoSJI.which is .an". 46 lihUe the
"ut ural s t and poi nt " t Sllpt s us to s ee aan as no th iq IlOre than a se1£ -
ellclose d hio-phys ical syst_ , the a tteapt t o de s crib e II.S.D "ss he is given"
t r ans f orlll$ th is s ys tem into a " l ebenswel t" (cf . PH, 219) wherein ea ch
hlllllan organism becceee t he cente r of his own special world, without whi ch
46Her bert Spiegelbe rg, "On Some Human Us es of Phenomenology , " i n
Phe nomeno l ogy in Pe rspectlve , ed . by F . J. smith , The Hague , Ni j boff ,
1970 ,p .22.
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he vovld ce as e to be huaan . And t h i s s peci a l world - t h la . 1 ella tion -
i ncludes the world of th e " t ho .... vbicb i n t urn encOIIp....a the wor l ds of
othe r " t hou ' s ". Spieselbe rg wond e r s : " How auc.h coul d . live awar ene,. of
this situat ion ad d to ou r respect , if DOt r e veren ce , for aan?"47
Lilte Spiegelberg. Rieoe",!:' 1. co ns cious of t he impo rtance of seeing
lMD I n h is singul arity and un iqueness - In s ho l:'t . that t o Bee "man" at
. 111a to s ee "a man" . Pe rhaps the DIOst significant overflow f rom a
Rico e urian anthropology- ln - v! a . In t erms of t he eaceecce ' s ro le as a
c i vilizi ng fo rce, 11 th e importance of seeing t he student as being "s ui
ge ne r18" . encountering h i ll own particular "Lebenswelt" . and the necessity
o f encou r a ging b 1111 t o s ee a nd r e s pe c t hilDs elf t bua , a a val l a s the
ne ce s sity o f p r oviding t he e duca t i onal tdlieu i n which he &ay wark ou t his
i ndividuality in t he context of his poten tial .
Let us t ak e s n"er of e:uJlllples in t he s res of educstional p r scUce.
The tes cller of lit e r a tu r . , fo r ill.5tance, lIU5t be ~are that t he individual
s t ud e n t wi ll~ the po- , the es s a y o r t he p l ay according t o his
O'WD perspecti ve jus: , indeed , a s the author hi...lf ba s i n t erpreted his
" l e bensw e l t " throu.gh his own pa r tic u l ar lIOde of see i ng , and frc. his OWD
s t a nce . The r e ade r c sn t ry to evoke a n empa t hy with the a u t ho r but he can
be s ucces sfu l on l y to t he po i n t tha t his own experien ce s s nd his own
i n te rp r e t a U on of th ... e x pe r i e nces coincide and s uc h co i nc i de nce can
never be total. Th i s 1& pe rhaps more tradiUon ally accepte d in the area
of dralllS wherein one p r odu csr ' s "interpretation" i a ex pected t o differ ,
41I bi d . , p , 2 3 .
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even r adi c ally , from that of a no t her . We llLay note th at th e Fre nch , ev en
i n t he a r ea of popular ao ngs, introdu ce .. song .. being " i Ilt e rpre t f " by ..
pa r t i cular vo c a l ist n t be r t ha n as be ing " aung" . Certainly, in t b.
ped a gogi cal realm , th e teacber may - - - and should --- as sist the chi l d
t oward a a g r u t e r "reaGine. s" f or hit coufr ontaUon with t he poet' . vision ,
t he eI..ayilt ' II th ea i • • o r t he pl aywright ' . _saage . by ' helpina hi.. uncover
pos sibl e de eper l ayer s of meaning , bu t in the fina l ana ly sis t he s t uden t 's
enc oun ter rich the work i s el1tlanced or l1a1t ed by hi. I rea re t or ieeeer
ab ility t o COIIllIl1;lIu eate rich t he a \lt hor an d .Und i n hta plau . To i ..pose
t he t each er' s own interpretation as If it were ultima te is as sho r tsighted
as it is vure f u! .
To pur sue the t ea ch i ng of l i te ra tu re , ve tan t ak e our analy.ilI
through a mor e crea tive path i n th e ca se of the pro duc tion of poet ry or
compoeit ion by t he s t uden t . One c. n ce r t.inly give t he s tudent t he
nec e ss a ry t echnique . fo r t he ...n.ipul eti on of wor ds and phraae. according
t o ce r tain establ ililhed rules and every poet , fo r i ns tance , it limited by
vocabulary r e s t rictionlll - t be "b eat" wor d taily be i mpos s i b l e t o f i nd - --
hu t t he student v i II wr i t e good or ba d poetry accor ding t o hie OVDpeculiar
" s t yle" and it is t he t ea che r ' lI pr i vilege t o en co ur age t he s t uden t t o
perfec t hit t ech nique t o i ta finest polish vithin the fratneWOrk of t ha t
aryle an d no t to d iscour.ge the student ' a efforta be c. .... e t b ey do no t fit
a pr ec on ce i ved moul d . The s ame obs e rv ation s co ul d be made, mutat it
mutandis , with r es pec t t o other areas of c r e a t i ve performan ce by s t udenra
- a r t , dr saa , alsic , s c..u p t ur e , painting , aan.... l a r t a , even cooking.
I n t he a r e . of r eligiou a educ a tion , t he t ea che r must needs be
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particularly ."are of iapos i ng his OWD pers pective and hiB own va l ue
sy s tem. A happy -ed t .... .us t he vorked out between 1ns pir aUou , on the Due
ha nd , and indoctrination , on the otbe r . While younger child r en , in wha t
Piaget ca lla t he concre t e operational s tage o f de velopment , are unable,
psychologically . t o .aka c:cspariaona between alteruate r eligi ous anawe ra,
it r emai n$ true t ha t th eir particula r r e ligious orientation mUlt be
respected. Their I,luderuanding of mat t ers r e ligious 11 c:l r c UlDS cr i hed not
only by t he intellectual, emotional and cultura l 1111it a U ons COl:DOD t o . 11
child r en but I s detet'ldnad . a vell by their own i nd ividua l experiences
s uch as parenta l love, t eacher behavi our . s en s e of wonder and th e like .
I n t be adolescen t years , a f oi sting of pre-set atanda r ds in the area of
belie f Is not onl y . v i olat i on of wha t a r e 11g10us pe da l osue wOllld , i n
t heory , r e gard a s a God-siven freedom, but is a 180 self-defeating since
belief cannot be i~sed.
The _ r l<. of one' s cha racter is impr i n t ed eve n on th e manne r i n whicb
a student enga ges in t he study of mathematics and science, r eflected in
the varyina; degrees of pe r severance he bri ngs t o a challenging pr oblea or
of methodic ca re witb whicb he IIOvea f r olll step t o s t ep towar da a so l u t ion .
Character i s omnipresent. One ' s bearing , the inflecti on of one ' s voice,
ev en on e ' . han dwri t ing , a l l po int i o th e direction of a uniquenesa as
pr onounced a. tbe pbysiea l un i quene•• of a finger-pr iDt .
To see a man in this light, a s uniqu e , i s t o se e him as a person ,
wbi ch is i_O$el,. more t han seeing h im aa an indi vidu.ll , i n t he se ns e
that an i..od.iVidual is a pa r ticu lar ins tanc. of the universal - a cha rac ter
" ty pe" , for i ns t ance , implying a certain inescapable "d es tiny" . The
1
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individual is bu t a ca rica tu re of th e pe n on. To be come a parson is t o
be cOGe pa r t of the co.-uni t y of aen who rupec t one -.nothe r - - • wor ld of
honesty and love , a JCan tian ' 'Ki1l8dclIl of End." . That is • world whi ch 18
c lose t o tbe visi on of Christiani ty fo r whi ch " t he rh eologial virtue of
cha r i ty 18 t ha par.dip 1 , r t he pe r son ' s ge ne rosi ty. and the ' ee-uni ou of
Salnts ' conf essed i n th e Christian~. is th at of t he mutu.lity of
pe r sona ." orr . 14 1) . Whi le Olle can s ee t he c on cr e te c..e aa an individua l
sampl e, as th e e t hologist te nds t o do , i t is t he pedagogue '. privilege an d
obliga tion t o tra~cend t bb ayop i c vi ew In ord e r t o bring a ll hi . ene r gies
t o he ar on th e livi ng , puleating r e aU t y which Is !!!!!. child, who will
be ecae !h!!. _ n alIlO rLg o t be r un i que _D. If it 1s pa tently impossi ble t o
op erate i n eh h manner i n the t ypica l public schoo l claas ro Oll with itl
t hi r t y , f or ty or mor e studen t s , it is bu t an ins tance of the f ailure of
the ory an d pr a c tice t o ve d , f or wbi h t he not i on of individual a t t ention
b very f s shi onsb l e , those who ac ce pt th e th eo ry ar e not always incli ned
to prov i de t he r . aour ce a to IIake it possible .
An appr eciat i on of the uniq ue ne s s and t he "mystery" of 1Il8n, ach i eved
11'1 ap ite of tbe aeduct iolUl of techno logy and t he graphs and ch ar t s of
would - be guidanc e couns ellors, brings ua ba ck f ul l philosophi ca l circ le· -
with th e Mounie r s and t he Ri coeu r s - - t o the fi rs t an th r opologis t ,
Sec r a te a , for whOll t he call t o ''kDO'li' th yse lf" was the fi rs t ca tegorica l
blp erative . 'What is ca lled for is , in Ri coeu r's t e rms, a Cop ern i ca n
r evol ut i on", whi ch r e ator es t o su bject i vi ty ita due ". (rN , 31).
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"O. Sub 1ec tivity
The Socrat ic: philosophy is the first a n t hropocent r ic: philosophy.
But antbropoc:entriSlll , as Pl a t o r eadily sa w, has I e. U._.1t ations , fo r
psychological i n t r os pe c t i on pre-sene. us with such • -or••• of c:ontudlc:tory
da t a t ha t 'We 108e ou r bea r i ngs in th e labyrinth . Man lIust be s t udied and
ca n be pro pe r ly un de r stood , Plato suggests , no t in his individua l l ife ,
but in hil political l ife whe rein tbe rext. of b.-ni t y 11 "wr it l a r g e" .
s uff i cien tly large that lID app ropr iate her1lleDeuric: aay be applied t o t he
charactera in or de r that the web of confusion , evident at the i nd i v i dua l
l evel, lILly be di .entang l ed . ThUB, Plato creates his "Republic" befor e he
creates hlf; " ..n" - • soci a l philosopby prec ed ea , ev en provides . an
anthropology. The man haa given wa,. . .. cen t er, t o " man" . The unlver ...l
11 , f or Plato , 1II0r e re a l than t he i nd i v i dua l. It is a ga i nlt t h i l Platonic
emphasis as i t has been pa ssed down t o much subsequen t philosophy t ha t
cou t esaporary exb t en t i a l philosophy is engaged i n cOClbat . Philoaophers
11ke Kierkeg aard - and e ven Ni etzsche , i n his va y - - have led the va y .
i n contempor ary ph ilosophy , i n trying to reverse t he Pla tonic hi erarchy ,
to esrablish the i nd i vi dual ' s prec ed ence ov er t he universal, cu1.lllinar ing
i n t he Sa r t r e an aphor~ , " Exiatence pr ee ldes eaeee ee",
After Plato , Ar istotle erya t allized t he t eDdency to categorization.
Man, amee Ar istotle , ha a be en enclosed withi n a fo rmul a, a de fin i t i on.
The e l aade definition - Aristotle's own - ptesents him s a " ani mal
r ationale " and th i l de fini tion r etains -...eh of itl force . in spite of the
ene r oa chJDetlu of JIOde ru i r rationa lism. Indeed , i t is pa t eDt that
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r at i onality is an inher en t cha r a c t e r ist i c of .11 hUlll&nactivity. However ,
th e g reat productions of myth , religion , poetry an d art --- e ven b ng ua ge
its elf - are overlaid with coun tIe s . a trata of non- r a t ional elements .
It la , pe rh ap s , .. W1111.. Bar rett suggeatl , t 1ae t o " question whethe r
(Ar i stotle ' .) def i nition is re ally t he ultlaate a t a t _ n t about aan" .48
If we examine myth, fo r instance , we find th at while it Is ce rta i n ly
not chao tic and does pos ae u some con cep t ua l sha pe - - &8 Ricoeur shows in
!'ymbol1gue du Hal and In hi. a tuclmeot t o t he Kantian diet". , ''I.e Syabo l e
don ne a penser" - it can s ca r cely be charact erbe d in itll~ 811
to t ally r ational. Religion, to o , pr es en ts i tse lf as being , a t t t llles,
immens e l y r ational , and c an 80ll1et l11leB be painfully . ys t elD& t ized : ye t , as
Cas . i r er poi nts ou t , • ~ntlan ....1181011' 'wi t hin th e lUdts of pur e r ea son"
f a i la t o convey .are than " t he sh adow of wha t a ge nuine and con crete
r eligious l 1fe 1s .,,49 Lang ua ge, aga i n , ia man's g re a t es t clai m to
uniquene.. SDOUg all livi ng t hings, bu t there ia an emotiona l l ana us ge a a
vell lUI a concep t ual one ; there is poe t ry as well u lo gi c , lUI when th e
poe t sing a of an irreais tible f o r ce lIIee tin& an i -..ovab l e obj e ct. The
non- r a t i ona l elements in modern a r t and i n modern literature , be ginning
with Jo yce' s Ul ya ses an d a ll th e way t o Bach' s Jo hnathon Ltvi ,g. t on Sea gull
a r. too patent t o ne ed elaborat ion , a l though th ey d ea r ly call fo r a
ber1lleneuti c. " Ruson" , as Caasirer no t es , " i a a very i nadeq ua t e t ena wi t h
48Wi l l1aa Bar re t t, I rra tiona l Man, London , BeinelllSnn , 1961, f o r ewor d .
49Erns t Cas lirer , An [.ssay on Man, New Yor k , Ya l e Universi t y PTess ,
1962 , p. 25.
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which to eomprehend th e forms of man's cu l tur a l Ufe i n an th e i r r i chn es s
and. va r ie ty" . SO
The ant hr opol ogis t of t he new persuasi on -- 1n the era of the
Cope rn i can Revol u t ion - . buns surting wi t h abltn c t definiUOUlI. J us t
as t he person alist Mounier " t akes his bea rings f r om a certain s ense of the
concre t e in t he Iil1ds t o f t h e f or-s of civiliza t iou" , tar , 138) so Ricoeu r .
inspired by ano t h e r of hi s compatr i ots . Gabriel Mar ce l , insis t s fr01ll the
be ginning on cca1lli to t ena& with " th e definite experi ence of enat ence
whi ch i s mys e l f i n a c0 l1'0ra l a i t ua t i on". (rN , 15) . In an y s t ruc t ured
.ys taa of cons i de ring 11&I1 , t he elt iltent individual 11 s~how l oa t , m\lch
8S laCks ' s he ro finds h1lllse lf l ost in the Cas tle. The i nd i vidual lUll -
th e pe rson - is IDOrt! than Aristotle ', r a tiona l animal or Devey ' . psy ch o-
bio l ogical probleg-aolv1ng organism or t he behaviouris t '. condit1onabl e
en t i t y, a l though he i a , i n a ae nse , al l of these . He i s ev en ee r e than
Cas a irer ' s "anillal aymboli cUI:I."S l a lthough that phr ase i s cfcee r t o
de s crip t ion t han OlOs t " de fin i t1 ons " .
I n any eve nt , a l l a uch sys t ems and de fini t i ona wi thin sys t ems relate
thems e l vea t o t he question , "!lli!l 18 man?" , ee if man we r e ano t he r thi ng
.-ona th ings, ••peclflc 1nstance of the general , to be labeled an d
ob j ec tivized a cc or d i ng to t he pr operties men have i n CQllllllOn •
• eee as a de f init e~ with a f lIed na tur e, an "essence" . Even
SOlb i d . , p , 26 .
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C&851r , r ' , cu t. t hat b i . ' de fini t i on ' doe a no t r ega r d man aa an ob ject
cannot escape the inevi t ab le pr oble- t hat i t s uff en f re- t he objeetiviQ. tlon
that~ definit io n con jures up . We may '.y, then , t ha t while al l attempts
to define ' man' have a place in t he philosophical enterprise , inasmuch ..
they provi de us with clues t o th e un de rstandi ng of . ..n , yet th e f ar
greate r qu e s tion whi ch _ would f ormlla t e . i n t he s pi r i t of Augustine' ,
Confessions as "~ is ..n? " doe s not ge t ••ked in aoy objectivistic ,
r e duc t l onis tic co nt ex t . The obj ec U vlzation of man --- t he answer t o t he
"wha t ?" - is va lid only . a a nece s s ary pr opadeutic to the unde rs t and i ng
of the pe r son - the answer t o t he "who?" .
Aris t otle vas quick t o insist , e a r ly in th e Ni ehoDa ch••n Et hi es
(cha pte r t h r ee o f bo ok one ) . t tul t t he na tu r e of t he s ub jec t be i ng eX3lIi ned
de ter mines. in large ee asu re , th e de gree of precision possibl e and t he
met hod ology t o be employed . PoU t i cs i s no t s n e xac t scienca ; an t h r opol ogy
I I no t geometry . Pa sc al , th e grea t Fr ench geome ter -phil oso ph a r, wss f ood
of dh tingu i shing " I 'espri t gea.et r i que " f ra- " 1 ' espri t de fluess e" . S2
The f orme r can never be appl i ed t o ea n , f or what cha rscte rizes e an is t he
dive rsity , t he he t e r oge ne i ty and th e veraatility of his nature . Thus , a
Spinoz 1s t ic e t h ics "1IIIOfe geomeu i co demon.uat a " would be, in Pas ca l ' s
v iew , an a.bau rd ity. S1a1 lar l y, t r a di tiona l l og i c and 1IIetaphys l cs , the
flrs t 1_ of which is th e l aw of con t r a.dlc tion , can never pr ovide an
an thropology , f or lllan is ne i t ber homogen eous nor cons ist en t . The
phil os oph er 11 ob Uged t o~ a real man , no t cona t ru c t an a r tificia l
52pascal,~, ed . by Char l es Loundr e, Paris , 1858 , p , 231.
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" r a t i ona l animal" o r " symboli c anima l ". at least 1f he pretends to
~. r a t her t han explain, t hat of which he speaks . Man ca nn o t be
un derstood i n terms of a mental physics but only on the basis of our
experience of his l ife and conduc t . There ca n be no single, simple form ula
in which man may be encapsulated --- man 's place is , somewha t pa radoxical ly ,
a no-man's l and , a no-place, between be i ng and non - being , be t ween t he
i n finite and the finite ; he oscillates, as it wer e , between two opposite
po l es. To speak like G. E. Moore, de fin i ng man is committing a ki nd of
' na t ur a lis t i c fallacy' .
And yet a ll this 1s not to deny t hat man i s , in fact , an ob ject.
J us t as man 1s free and yet , in another respect , unfree, j us t as his act
of signifying transcends his act of pe r ception , just as bis word escapes
all the bounds that work woul d imply , and jusc as his c ons en t t ransfortnS
his neces s i t y i n t o freedom, so it 1s that although he cannot be t o t all y
i n t e r pr e t ed as an object , he is , none th eless , an ob j ec t which ca n be
obj ectively investigat ed by the biologist and the. physiologist , a s well as
by the e thologist. Rico e.ur does no t, as we ha ve seen , dismiss the findings
of any human endeavour which would serve to prOVide us with i nf o rma tion
abo ut man , th e object . Man is , i ndeed , matter for the chemist , the
sociologist, the cultural an thropol ogist and t he ethologist .
Rut that he is an object rema ins a very one -sided truth. The s ame
body which can be ob j ec tively studied by the technician i s the body whi ch
i a my "corps propre" and , as such , un availabl e to any microscope.
Information abo ut t he object-body is use f ul, even necessary -- biological ,
psychological . cu lturo-Iogical, in formation --- provided one remembers
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tb a t s uch data ae noe a in the c:. pae i t y of a 4iagnos t i c t o the uncovering of
the un ique s ub jec t . Just as .. doctor dee1ph e l"l t he pati en t '. S}'1IIp t OlU to
arrive a t a d1a gnoala of t he ai l ment . 80 th e ph ilosoph er may re ad t he aigna
whi cb t he s eve r al s c ience . ..lr.e availab le t o hill i n order t hat he _, r ea ch
t o t he profundi ty of t he su bjective be ing . whi ch t he s cientist vould e ither
dhm1.. as fict i on , be cause it is unava i lable t o his t e chniques and 80
unverifiable . or would i gno r e a ltoge t he r .
Indeed , t he ve ry s uffle "- logl ca l " serve. well t o eapha aize tha t I n
t he d.o-aill8 of bi ol ogy . psych ology end. ewtu nl anth rop ol ogy , as well as
in t he ar ea of e tho logy, one~ 1IlllD as if he were so mehow an
objec t , man in t e rms of and in rel at i on t o s OIIething e lse, man t o be
charter and graphed and made t he pb y- thinl of . t,tbr i dena . S3 I nevitably ,
in t hia ltind. of pr esentation of t he case , one is ab so r be d ill elliFlana tion ,
th e a t t empt t o give an account of , t o pro duc e t he ca uses and con di tions,
to ana l yze and d i s se c t . t o "explain away" . When we " t alk abo u t " llIan i n
thi a aanner - w ell we t ry to s ubs 1.&e all bis activi t ies un de r the
Ullbrella of some " e ll:planat i on " . we a r e being unfaithfu l t o t he total
reali ty which we want to ar ticulate, t he lived (vecu ) exp er i enc e . That
e ll:J'e rience is ce r tai nly s usc e pt i b l e t o exp lanat i on ; to a t t elllp t t o "expla i n"
S3Ev..n t he t erm " an t hr opo l ogy" as we are using i t i n t h i s cODt ell:t is
susceptible t o t he aS1lle k ind of c r i t i cism . For th is rea son , and to be
cons btent , we hav e toye d with the i dea of aba ndoni ng t he t e rm and r eplac in g
it by "philos ophy of e ae" but s uc h a usa ge c r e a t e s more pr ob lems t han i t
s o lves , including the gr 8lllUtical pr oblelll of adj ectival us a ge . I n aDy
case , the ten ha s become s an c t i f i e d by usS&e and we have de cided t o r e t ain
i t , while r esuining awar e of its inadeq ua cy.
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why a man s uff e rs pain or fee ls joy, what viscer al trtlns f orma tions occur
a t t hea. t1aoes , fo r instance . I s • Iegit t _tll enterpris e. 'Ye t t he
explanation al way. r e1Dil1ns one step r emoved frOlll the u:pe rienc ll its elf and
th e only neap. f rDla t hat 1JIpaa se 18 • ae rious , painstak i ng des cription
which pr es ents th e phen cmena "as they are given " wi t h th e ir IIlB ny,
po lychr omat ic ee ee ce , Man , ultimat ely , cannot he explained , ... a mac.hine
ca n be exp lained . Effort s t o llEpl ain ..0 thus , engaged In by psyebologilu
like I. F. Skinner, eocc e ed , if a t all , only bec ause it I , a s sumed a pr i or i
t hat ~ ia as ~y aniaal , a very cOIIIplex one , it I, t rue , hut as one of
thea , non e theless, I t I , not eh il writer' , intention t o d i smiss Ski nne r
Il1O c rude l y - we eentdcn hi. lIIe r e ly t o i llustrate , by • par, dip i ns taD ce ,
the _ t had of exp lAMt ion whi ch we are oppo sing to the _ t had of descrip tion .
We mere ly wish to . uggest t ha t ca us a l exp lana tion and re ductionism gi ve
only a di.torted sepent of th e whol e pic ture , a l t hough thia lind of
procedure has its place , if pr ope rly loca te d , in the total framew or k of a
heraeneuric: of bUlU.n c:ulture a nd c ivilization .
E. Pro pe r Use of Etholosical Data
Explanations of man --- " talking ab out" man - - - in a con t empor ary
eeeeext are more likely t o be in th e areas of p.ych ology or bi ology or a
kind of h istorica l and ar chae ol ogi ca l ant hr opol ogy , an d not s o IllUch in the
r ea 1A of cha racte r - .cienc:e , es pec ially the kind of e t ho logy elabo ra ted by
1l1c:~ur , t he e t hol ogy of t he Dutch schoo l of Heymans and Wiersma. Indeed ,
empi rica l etholog y of any so r t is somewhat f oreign to an y Angl o-Saxon
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ph1losophical d i8 c...... ion . None t he less , 11'1 Nortb AlIerte l, we do place a
gr e a t deal of emph..1s and. r e liance on a l l manner of tes t a - IQ t e sta,
apt i t ude testa and pe r s onality inventories - whi ch s e rv e , in our hiih
school. and our coun s e.· i.I ee uee ee , .. cha racter portr a i t a , j us t as mJ.Ch
a. the combination . of emot iney, pr11113r i t y and s econda ri t y s erve , 8.IlIeng
s ome Euro pe an r e aeercbers , a . meaM to th e as ligna Uon of cha r a c t e r types
t o individua l . . These ob j ec t i ve indices t o t he cha r ac ter of a huaan be i q
present him with . fat e , a duriny , I t l ea st illlpliei t ly . One is~.
it Is aa . UIIled. by t he " t ype " i n t o whi ch on e ca n be IIlOst app r op riat e l y
110 t ted. In . paral l el _nner , i t 1. ba coaing i ncre• • 1n&ly vides pread
t hat one I s mor al behavi our is no t t o be condemned or bl amed bl,1c I s t o be
seen -ore . a the r e aul t o f one' a c ond i tioning or eve ll o f one' . gene. ,
eon j ur ing up the ni ghtlllar e of gen e tie eng i ne e ring a. t he ••ving fo re e of
• fu t u r e eiviliza tion.
lUeoe ur eon tends t ha t na t ural, t empe r ament a l eharaeter isties are , i n
t hems elves , e t h i ea l l y neut r al. r oe in stanee , a IIlan is no t de stined t o be
fo r eve r un trustwor t hy beeaus e s ome e t ho l ogi s t'. t es ta r eflee t a propensity
t o untruatworthinea. . He wi l l be t rustworthy o r r a liabl e a eeo r d i ng to a
ee rtain styl e , i t is t r ue - - a s t yle whieb 18 a s un iquel y his as hi,
pa r tieul a r eo llb i na tion of ge nes - bu t whe th e r he t ums out t o be vi e i ous
o r virtuou s doe s DOt depend 011bis eha rae t er. As we ha ve indiea t ed
ea r lie r, Ar istotl e , in h i s!!h!£.! eon t en ds against those who 'WO uld elaim
that ... mus t be born wi t h a na t ural gif t fo r eor r ee t IDOral j udgments. 55
55et.our pa ge 42 .
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ll1c:oeur ar gue s t bat " t.he r e a re no ainds exeluded frQll.-.II mora lit )' ; nor
are there cha racter type. which possess .or.li~ as • ~tur.l right . " (rN .
370 ) . If t his Is the case, th~ .11 values a re av.l1ab1. , a t least i n
SOllIe r es pec t. t o every cha racter type. For edu ca t or s, t he waruing of Alain
11 pe r t i nen t : ' 'We Ilua t no t be too hasty In jud gi ng ell_r ac te r ". he says,
" •• th ou gh decreeing t ha t on e man i s a so t and th e other l a t y f orever .,, 56
The s tudent ' s f \l t ur e is an open- en ded one . a. 11 " des t i ne d" only t o
live an d behave i ndividualisti ca lly, bu t he can ",ell' h1l individua li ty
ei t her i n a k ind of he rme t i c exis t en ce , se a l ed off a , an " individual" . or
a a • member of • society of e en who pr opos e t o work in hs nwny . prec i se l y
II "per sons" . I n t he l at t er pe rspe c tive , t he edu C&t ot" s r ole is to
" s oc i a lize" the a t lolCi en t no t i n t he s ense that he i a to a ssUIIIe un t o hillSelf
a l l t hos e characteriatica and .anoers wb.1ch a r e typical of an obj ec tified,
abs t ract so ciety , t he r eb y s ac r ifi c i ng his uniquene n for the f alseness of
a theatrical ego , but r a ther as s unique and free being who a l ons Wit h
other equally unique an d equally f ree personA Will vork t o create a ne'll'
" s oc i ety". It is that mabitian wich .. ust challeng s eac h emerging
leneraUon and it i a the pedagogue 's res po ns ib ili t y t o assi s t iII. the
realization of t hat goal . A t eacher lIlust assiat th e s t ude n t to und erstand
h illls elf, to define hilllllelf, i n t he s ens e t ha t definition i mplies s
limitation, a cir c umsc r i pti on . The adole sc eo t, the on. who is be eoml ng an
a dul t , ofte n s ee s t he nee d f or change , sometimes radica l cha ng e , bu t he
56A1a i n , op . cit., p . 24.
"IlIUB t work wi thin the limitations of his charact er. To th ese limitations
he must co nsent, proceeding apace t o do wha t h e can do best. But thes e
l i mi t a tion s are methodological , r a ther than constitutive . It i s the
totality of his pe rsona l i t y which he mus t accept and no t t he sp ecific
aspects of t he involuntary such as pa rticular habits and desires. I de a lly
(tha t is , abs t racting from t he pa t ho logical). it is possible to change any
ha b i t o r control any desire, if t he proper self-discipline is applied, fo r
~-discipl1ne is an interplay be twe en t he finite and the infinite. l.'e
accept what Alain says that " . . . each i ndividual is born , lives and dies
accord i ng co his own nature. as th e crocodile is a crocodile and • . . he
changes no t at al l . ,,57 But his natur a l propensities are, as we have said ,
ethically ne ut r a l ; th ey are, of themselves, no n-dir ectional in terms of
his ul t i mat e decision and action .
Thus, al though Illy cha racter lIlay be understood a s a fat e or a destiny,
fo r it is omnip resent an d i nvincible, yet it do es not determine what I
shall becone , My freedom is also present t hr ou ghou t and "imp rints its
stamp ev en on my co nstitution" . (FN, 368) . My ch aracter is only my
freedom's mann e r of being; my f r ee dom is th a t kind of non -creative freedom
wh i ch wor ks wi thi n the co ntext of a complex of givens. A freedom thus
situated-by the "fate" of a cha racter to which it consents becomes, then,
not so much a destiny which is de termined for me , but rsther a vocation.
A science of character is alwsys in dan ger of abuse, but it is equally
57op . cit.,p . 24 .
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ava i l ab le t o • work of deliver ance and eve ry t ••ehe r has the double poorer
t o us e ethologica l data for 8004 o r f or ill. (d. nc, 373).
A pedagogy whi ch labeb ch ildr en too re. dUy or whieh ca t egod te s
them t oo definitively is • dang erous disc i pl ine if it ••S IDeS too laUch , If
i t permi ts itself to be ce:-e s pe llbo un d and t hereby Vi c timi ze d by statistical
pJ:'oflle5. knowledge nev er abl a l ve s the educator f r Olll th e need fo r what
Rieoeur ca lls " s enlli t l vity" and what is of t en r ef e r r e d to nowad ays as
" empathy" . (FN, 372). To us e et hol ogy only in a psyc:hotec:hnical fashion
is a de gr ada tion , as LeSenne s tresses. 58 The "I" 18 i rreducible - t hi s
18 one of th e meritl of th e Gear. lUsts , that th ey hav e emphas i zed that
t he aggregate is a re uer th an the sum of its partl . To r es pec t the myltery
of the 'thoc ' o f t he o tber is the fi rst pl ank i n t he plattor'll of the good
pe dag ogue - - in his own perfOr1lla nce , a5 well aa i n b i a a t t empt t o en courag e
• I1ke attitude on t he pa r t of one s t ud en t to war d ano t he r. One of th e
..jor difficwtiea with a tudenu i n thia las t t h i r ..t of o ur century la to
b ring thea t o s ee t hat t heir dl!llland f or freedca ia no t unilater a l, tha t
f reedOlll. in a aocie ty bring a with it , i pso fae to, ita OVD. 11.111t a tions , and
tlut freedOlllca n l eg i t ilaate l y be s een no t _ rely as an abs en ce of r estraint
(f or tha t is a chime ra) but as an avaLl.bil i t y for seevrce . Total ,
unbridled f r eed Olllis alw aya a ca r i c a t u r e, but eore espec:Lally lllIlOng th e
young who a re as ye t onl y a l owl y coming to avarenes s of t hems el ves, for
tha t kind of freedom 1a • freedom wf t hoc t understanding , without empa th y
and without l ove. UndeJ:'stood pJ:'operly , freedom a cc epts t he limitations of
58Op. cit . , p , 325.
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natur e , and t ha t ethologi ca l i nforaation which aeeas i n iti ally to cOllldemn
one t o a cipher on a cha r t of e t hologi c a l fOnlulae can lead one "to
r es pe ct, t o love, and finally , • . . to set f ree th e i lIlllutable nature in
each man . " (FN, 372).
F . ~
We ha ve tJ:ted in thi. chapte r t o pinpoint sever a l aspects of Ri c:oeur 's
descriptive phenomenology of t he wi ll whi ch can provide a ap rlngboard for
• pa rtlc:ubr heraoene ut ic: of eduution. whi ch ¥(luld be ult iJRat e l y concerned
with t he i nterplay of t beory and practice i n the educat ional pr oe e.s. Such
a h er1lleneu t i e i nvo l ves a t l east two dime nsions.
In tb e fi r s t place , th e r e 1. r equi r ed a well-developed anthrop ol ogy
t o pro vi de. fram ewor k withi n which one ca n ecee to understand. t he h UDl8D
person wh i ch the ed ucator proposes to " co- c r ea t e" . Of particul ar i nte res t
in ebb context Is the e t e r na l question of t he lIIe.ni na of hUlll8n freedOlll
and we uve indicated tut it i a R.icoe ur' s sabition to effect s s yn t hesi s
thrOl,lgh the counterba l ancing of fre edOlll and natur., a syntheda which
p ro d\1Ce a a -otlva ted, incarnat. an d contingent f reed... This . 7Ot h.d.
leads ultiaatel y t o an unde r .tanding of f reede. a. a love of fat e , on e's
own and that of th e " other ", and imp lici t within t he ac t of ccaeene is t he
acknowl edgment of tran s cen dence , f or the first limitation t ha t demand s
accep tance is the fa c t that t he ego did no t c reate i u elf . Witho l,lt
t ranscendence . our consent would be a capitulation, an abs urd ity. But as
l ong a. t r an.cendence i , but ' bope and pe r fec t conse.. t \mav aU.ble, our
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f reedolll r elllainlll ever a pr ecari ous fr eed olll, situated wi th i n a re c a l citrant
temper ament an d b\.llU;n fa lli bility. Th. Na rebsus which l ingers in eve ry
f allible -.an would have ...s 19uo r e what lU.c:oeur <:&118 t he "weight o f
sit_tiona" and woul d delude ua i nto a Uet iolUll . tota l f reedaD, au t onomous
and God-les s, if onl y we had IIIOre an swers and a bett er technology . But as
Kounle r puu it , "we are fr ee only t o the extent t hat we are no t entirely
f ree . " (HI , 85 ) . I t is • Vital , fr ee con s en t to the unfree in ea ch of ua
which makes s an ity po.. ih l e an d lifts us out of th e drif t towa r ds abs urdity .
In t he se cond place , we have ind i c ated the us e on e llI&y legi t llnat e l y
make of th e findinas of any of th e huN.II or physical science. which IllUSt .
of necessity, t re at the body a. object . I t 1. no t. _ ttar of r e f using
the evi dence of s c i ence hut r a t her of finding an a cceptable inte r pret a t ion
of th e iWlplications of these findings , s o that one can ~ the calcnLa tiOD a
of sc i en ce a s guides in establithing the student's potential , within t he
lilll.its of his fini t ude .
The imp licatiolltl fo r ped agogy may be sUllllllllri~ed in tems of r es pec t
and _pathy . Reapec t involves an app reciation fo r the tmiq...enell of th e
other and an acceptance of th e pa rt i cu l a r perspec tive f roq and vithin which
the s t udent vi ews his world . It i nvolves , as well , an e ff ort to he lp the
s tudent unde rstand hiaself and his pa r tic ular l imitat i ons eo tha t he _ y
aslte in telligent choice s about which ca re e r to f o llow, for ~le. Th us ,
th e s t uden t lIlay develop a healthy res pe ct fo r his aim c apacities and will
not a t t empt to becom e t ha t t o which he ha s little orientation. He will be
able t o dev ote all his energi es to va rlting out his t e-poral destiny 1D the
r e a lll of what he c an do bes t . Empa t hy involves a r elationship to t he
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studen t whi cb wil l unde rstand that diff erences are invincible and have t o
be l oved .
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